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The purpose of this paper is to study the implementation of the
legislatively-mandated labor protection provision incorporated in the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1973. The case study contained herein
describes and elucidates the implementation of the Airline Employee
Protection Program at the U.S. Department of Labor.
Implementation as an organizational and administrative phenomenon
is examined. This includes a review of several attempts to bring order
and perspective to bear upon the subject. While the purpose of this
paper is to study a case in the labor field, it is with the express a
priori intent to critically analyze the application of administrative
theory to a first-hand situation. In this way, this case study will be
different from previous studies of implementation where researchers
were required to utilize secondary and tertiary documentation* in this
case, the author was intricately involved in the implementation process
on a day-to-day basis. It is anticipated that this close observation
and intimate involvement will lend vitality to this enterprise and
enhance the explication of the implementation phenomenon.
The case study involves three segments: a canvas of the relevant
legislative history; assessment of specific Congressional intent on
certain highlighted issues; and, an examination of the development of
the program machinery for the delivery of services,
problems that are examined include: (l) the gaining ox a consensus on
issues ; (2) the difficulty of developing regulations
when no
accompanying appropriations have been enacted and when no specific
2enforcement powers are contained in the legislation; (3) the inherent
conflict involved when new legislation has been passed that contains
certain provisions distinctly distasteful to and publicly disavowed by
the President; and, (4) the lack of ciear-cut Departmental leadership
compounded with competition between agencies in overlapping areas.
These problems were the most pervasive and were further compounded by
inter-Departmental complexities that were unique to the legislation,
e.g., requiring the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to make a
determination that an airline had suffered a sufficiently large
"qualifying dislocation" before benefit payments could be made by the
Secretary of Labor to those laid off. In addition, the Act required
consultations between the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of
Transportation on certain aspects of implementation.
The last chapter reviews the course of development of the program
policies and, in addition, attempts to generate feasible forecasts
regard ing the success of the implementation eiiort for Airlines a,id
other legislation. Recommendations of specific courses oi action that
would facilitate the implementation of future programs in the employee
protections area are made. A orief summation o. the lindings,
conclusions and recommendations complete the study.
In the spring of 1973, the author was detailed for a time from his
position as a program anaLyst in the Office of Planning, Evaluation and
Systems (0P2&S), Labor-Management Services Administration
,
Department of Labor in Washington, D.C. to the Office oi
Labor
Management Relations Services ( LMRS) , another component of
the same
Agency. His duties involved participating in the
estabiisnment of the
3Redwood Employee Protection Program (REPP) which had been signed into
law by the President on March 27, 1973, (P.L. 95-250). Following some
initial success in assisting the professional industrial relations
specialists establish this program, the author was assigned on 1 July
1973 to LMRS for the purpose of assisting in the implementation of a
portion of the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) of 1973 (P.L. 95-504, 92
Stat
. 7250, 49 U.S.C. 1371, 1552) which was fast approaching
enactment. In fact, the ADA was signed into law on 24 October 1978.
The author continued to participate in the implementation of this
program, known as the Airline Employee Protection Program (AEPP)
through the summer of 1979-
CHAPTER I
EMPLOYEE PROTECTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION
The history of America is rich with stories of poor immigrant sons
and daughters aspiring to social class, wealth and property ownership
through hard work. Indeed, the cycle has been repeated by generations
of working people paving the way for their children to improve their
stock by dedicating their lives to sacrifice and hard work. This
apparent social mobility has been rooted in the promise that hard work
would manifest success. Success translated into the material
accumulation of capital and property. This transcendent view of work
was based on the shared beliefs of equality and opportunity: It was
made possible by the system of craft guilds. A young man would enter a
guild as an apprentice, apply himself by learning ail aspects of his
trade, and, eventually, work his way up to master craftsman. The
historical expectation was that the young worker would succeed in
applying himself by mastering the technical skills of his craft and,
then, would engage in small independent entrepreneurial enterprise. As
time passed, the small business would grow as a result or the
improvement in the management and financial skills oi the owner and ohe
ability of the firm to amass capital. As businessman, the owner would
profit through the employ and production of others, i.e., apprentices,
journeymen and masters. Thus, workers were never "locked in or
"pigeon-holed" in a class of work from which they could never rise
above. The promise of upward mobility continued to tuel the dreams
and
the determination of earlier Americans. These early
American
4
5assumptions were predicated upon two beliefs: economic mobility and a
constant demand for new labor. However, as America reached its present
borders, frontiers for independent business enterprise for the guild
and craft skills diminished. As wave upon wave of immigrant workers
reached American shores, the tremendous demand for labor, particularly
cheap labor, became satiated. Economic mobility, while not completely
eliminated, has become more difficult to pursue without a formal
education which in itself has become a perquisite of tne established
middle and upper classes of the nation. Industrialization, automation
and the development of the factory system throughout the 19th and 20th
centuries have rendered the concept of guilds virtually obsolete in
most industries. Further aggravating the insecurity of the workplace
has been the trend towards specialization. While specialization may
improve productivity and quality on a company-wide basis, it severely
limits the repertoire of skills that improve tne marketability of the
blue-collar worker. It appears to severely reduce the psychological
rewards of the worker due to constant repetition and a resulting lack
of ,'job stimulation. The net effect of these social and economic
changes has been a growing perception of a fixed working class within a
more stratified American society.
This recognition of a more-or-less static "working class oegan oo
replace the historical American view of the "worker oecoming
employer .
”
This in turn resulted in the realization that the
heretofore demeaning Dut accepted temporary conditions that were
present in the unskilled and semiskilled wo rk areas were
becoming
permanent in nature and demographically definable by economic
class.
6This recognition oi a permanent state of undesirable work conditions
inevitably led those concerned, i.e., the workers and social
progressives, to press for improvements in all facets of the work
environment. The development of the union movement was instrumental in
improving the workplace. At first, interest focused on wages, hours
and working conditions, but due to constant technological change and an
abundant supply of labor, workers’ concerns expanded to their job
security
.
This view of one's job as a possession is demonstrated by the two
approaches that are commonly applied today in private sector collective
bargaining agreements. One approach seeks to achieve employment
stability and some insulation against the economic misfortunes that a
company might suffer over which the workers have virtually no control.
This objective is achieved through provisions insuring some degree of
job protection . Multiple methods exist by which to accomplish this
labor objective. Some of the most common that are applied singularly
or in combination in labor-management contracts are: seniority
(precedence in layoff and recall rights); sole union jurisdiction (to
perform express types of jobs or to operate certain highly-skilled
machinery); work rules (setting minimum crew sizes); slack work
provisions (spreading out the available work); attrition (allowing
normal employment turnover to reduce labor force size); and, bumping or
transfer (relocating to other jobs or geographical locations). If an
employee must be laid off or terminated due to adverse economic
7conditions, technological obsolescence or business efficiency, and the
worker cannot be employed elsewhere within the company, then the second
approach may be prescribed.
This approach stems from the belief that the worker has lost
something of value, i.e., his job. If he is to be laid off or
terminated, then the beneficiaries of this action have a responsibility
to assist the dislocated employee in readjusting to his new economic
situation. This is commonly called adjustment assistance . It tnay take
the form of economic assistance, training assistance or, simply,
advance notice of layoff. Economic assistance may include severance
pay, supplemental unemployment benefits (S.U.B.) or the opportunity for
early retirement. Severance pay and S.U.B. are paid in addition to
unemployment compensation* Generally, all forms of adjustment
assistance, including unemployment insurance, are funded by the
employer. However, many of these benefits are limited to employees in
the major unionized industries. It is interesting to note that only
20 % of the industrial labor force belong to unions and collective
bargaining agreements extend coverage to only 25& of the work force.
The author shall discuss specific legislative efforts to address
issues of job security further along in this study. Suffice it to say
for now that the U.S. Government has no clear-cut policy regarding job
security beyond unemployment insurance. Due to the aosence of an
explicit policy direction, Congress has seen fit to fashion unique and
diverse remedies to meet each situation according to unique interest
group pressures and other influences. Also, it must be noted that
while there is no government policy on employee protections, that fact
8has not. in any way stemmed the increasing demand for specialized job
security provisions. A discussion of the dynamic aspects of
implementation is now appropriate.
The body politic, through its representatives, legislates the law
of the land; the law that all people must abide by, and, if necessary,
adjust to. T'ne passage of a law is only the first act of stated
intentions in a long series of progressively detailed decisions. What
occurs in ^ n i s sequence is the translation of an expansive idea, a
metaphysical conceptualization containing no substance, to a physical
state of minute but coherent procedures that provide outputs (products
or services;. The impact of the outputs should, in fact, produce the
desired outcomes (satisfy the anticipations) as stated in the law.
Thus, the application of the law involves the creation of the means to
meet tne ends. The creative interaction between the elements of the
means-ends dichotomy is, in a structural sense, implementation.
In examining implementation, one might very well observe a variety
of situations ranging from chaos to harmony, i.e., organic
confrontation and complementary cooperation. In an idealized
situation, one would expect to see a streamlined supportive composition
of systematic components working together in a unilinear ’’cause and
effect" relationship; however, in the least desirable situation, it is
likely that one would observe a directionless conglomerate that is
fractionalized oy continuing discord oetween dissimilar parts. This
would generally result in a cancellation of efforts in either a random
or purposeful manner. Bureaucracies are the elements and the catalysts
of implementation, as well as being the deliverers of public services
9or social /economic outputs. The nature of bureaucracies is of utmost
importance in understanding implementation. A common criticism of
bureaucracies is their meandering and lethargic movement. 3ut, if one
looks beneath the surface of this criticism, another phenomenon becomes
apparent. Beneath, there is an ardent interplay of commitment and
reservation. Actors commit resources to some degree or reserve them to
some degree. One does not usually find the participants acting in an
extreme fashion; rather, commitment or reservation occur in partial
degrees. ^hile each actor has his or her own purposes and intents,
certain mitigating factors normally prevent any extreme actions from
occurring: These factors include a prime emotional deterrent, i.e.,
the survival oi a viable career. That personal motivation precludes
excessive activity outside ot an ambiguous unwritten professional norm
enforced by both contemporaries and superiors. When decision-making is
left to specialists, i.e., those who are intensively trained in a
certain discipline and who would have difficulty transfering their
skills out of an exclusive industry, the survival precept is
paramount. On the other hand, generalists, if not co-opted by a
multitude of intervening factors such as political vulnerability, may
enjoy a greater latitude in their decision-making and, thus, will be
the ones that press the margins of the professional norm for their
personal advantage and/or on behalf of their constituents.
It should be pointed out that instances demanding critical
decisions important to the overall success of one’s career are few and
far between for the typical professional bureaucrat. Many, in fact,
employ a strategy of risk-avoidance in order to preserve their options
10
for continued success. ihis strategy of risk-avoidance does not
readiiy facilitate the translation of a legislative intent into a
successful, timely and fully responsive program. Quite to the
contrary, it is the very nature of implementation that requires a
succession or decisions latent with risks and unknowns. These
decisions must be made in as objective and immediate a fashion as
possible; yet, there must exist a clear and precise understanding of
the original intent of the law and an assumption that errors will be
committed
.
Because implementation is not conducted in a political vacuum, it
is highly susceptible to both political inputs and political
consequences. In fact, it is highly political merely because it is in
immediate linear proximity to the legislative process. It is political
because it occurs prior to the formalization of the routine.
Institutionalization of a number of routines in a program provides some
degree of insulation from political inputs because it provides a
formalized quasi-legal basis for denying political requests or
resisting political pressures, if implied by the chief policymaker in
charge of the program. Every little detail may have political
ramifications during the implementation stage. Necessarily,
implementors, i.e., he or she who implements, will be in a position of
making value judgments. Sometimes, they will be made without
sufficient knowledge to do so. There may not be any analogous or
comparable experience from which to correlate decision-maxing. So the
author humbly takes exception to one of the pioneers in public
administration, Herbert A. Simon, when he states, "In so far as
11
decisions lead toward the selection of final goals, they will be called
'value judgements'"; so far as they involve the implementation of such
goals they will be called 'factual judgements .'" 1 What Simon seems
to overlook is the moment of metamorphosis when the electricity is
applied to Doctor Frankenstein's pet project and the monster changes
from a vision in the good doctor's head to an entity with a life of its
own. At that point, as with a newly-christened government program, it
becomes a viable life form. It may or may not be controllable by its
creators and, to some degree, at least, may demonstrate qualities of
self -sufficiency.
To dichotomize as Simon does into categories of policy (ends) and
administration (means) is too neat. Simon concedes this in a paragraph
following his suggested tneoretical conclusions regarding normative and
empirical questions:
"It would be naive to suggest that the division of work
between legislature and administrator in any actual
public agency will ever follow very closely the lines
just suggested. In the first place the legislative
body will often wish, for political reasons, to avoid
making clear-cut policy decisions, and to pass these on
to an administrative agency. In the second place the
administrator may be very different from the neutral,
compliant individual pictured here. He may (and
usually will) have his own very definite set of
personal values that he would like to see implemented
by his administrative organization, and he may resist
attempts by the legislature to assume completely the
function of policy determination, or he may sabotage
their decisions by his manner of executing them."-
12
No doubt, he is closer to the truth with this representation than with
his hypothetical conclusions. The implementation process is the
catalyst of administration after the policy has been decided. Thus, it
assumes an importance potentially far greater than the actual
administration of a program which may be quits rote. The difficulty
lies in tne over-simplification of policy and administration. Simon
essentially sees the legislature as the policy-giver and administration
as the production facility (a la Frederics Taylor.) This is accurate to
a point; however, it does not taxe into account the dynamics of a
constructive interface between the legislative processes and
administrative processes. These dynamics include the definition of
function, the elaboration of operating plans and detailed procedures,
the creation of budgets, the development of positions, the hiring of
personnel and the location of facilities and all that goes into them.
These are the institutional dynamics. In addition, there are
programmatical dynamics. Interpretation of tne law and the legislative
history, assigning appropriate integral priorities, gaining consensus
on vital issues, maintaining liaison and consulting on required matters
as well as complying with all regulatory requirements are but a few of
these programmatical dynamics.
Aiso, in a macroscopic and conceptual sense, implementation is a
dynamic process. It is an expansion rather than a contraction; a
growing rather than a shrinking. It may compete for limited resources
with existing programs. It may overlap jurisdictions and duplicate
services. It will probably require a reactive adjustment on tne part
13
oi some existing agencies or programs. These are all elements of
change and change is the essence of tne process. It is creative in
nature, experimental in conduct and aggressive in competition. Due to
this creative nature, the implementation process feeds on new ideas and
fresh approaches. The intellectual characteristics of implementors are
some of the most demanding in any profession: varied experience and
background
;
wide perspective and multifaceted knowledge; ability to
observe and analyze inductively and deductively, vertically,
horizontally and diagonally; ability to adapt old concepts to new
applications, extrapolate, correlate and inter; research, communicate
and judge. All of these aspects and more are necessary to be a
successful implementor. But, in a sense, these are all manipulations
of existing practices; without fresh input, the well would go dry. At
the wellspring of implementation are ideas, theories and hypotheses.
These conceptions are the gist of structural creativity.
''Implementation, then, is tne ability to forge subsequent links in
the causal chain so as to obtain the desired results."" The key word
in Pressman and Wildavsky’s definition is "causal." ^hat is
constructed during policy-making will engender the desired outcomes;
what is constructed in the implementation stage will determine the
output. Hargrove, in his monograph, "The Missing Link, The Study of
The Implementation of Social Policy," makes an important distinction in
the use of the term "implementation." On one hand, it describes tne a
priori state of planning an overall policy strategy; on the otner hand,
4
it describes the a postiori state of program execution. The primary
focus of this paper is encompassed in the second meaning, although
14
Caere will be often, useful and necessary reference to the first
state. Much of the first state is usually embodied in the text of the
law and in its legislative history. "Implementation does not refer to
creating the initial conditions."” v ew modern laws are simple
statements of purpose and rule in the tradition of English common law;
our oendency or late in law-making and jurisprudence has been towards
the specificity of the Napoleonic codes of law, e.g., ERISA (Employee
Retirement Income Security Act), OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health
Act)
,
ano IRS (Internal Revenue Service) tax laws.
"To emphasize the actual existence of initial
conditions we must distinguish a program from a
policy. A program consists of governmental action
initiated in order to secure objectives whose
attainment is problematical. A program exists when the
initial conditions - the 'if' stage of the policy
hypothesis - have been met. The word 'program'
signifies the conversion of a hypothesis into
governmental action. The initial premises of the
hypothesis have been authorized. The degree to which
the predicated consequences (the "then" stage) take
place we will call implementation. Implementation may
be viewed as a process of interaction between the
setting of goals and actions geared to achieving
them. "°
In the strictest sense, implementation does not include the incremental
changes (technical or operational improvements) that occur beyond the
initial start-up of a program. Those changes more readily fall into
the domain of institutional analysis, operations research and program
evaluation.
Case studies in implementation analysis are scarce. To be more
than simply descriptive, a case study must include a paradigm of at
least a rudimentary calibre. To properly analyze, one must have a
15
reference with which to compare and measure, be it performance,
objectives, resources or any other parameters. There is no surfeit of
actual case studies of implementation and only a few words that can be
considered of genuine theoretical significance. Eugene Bardach's, The
Implementation Game: What Happens After a Bill Becomes a Law , must be
considered one of the authoritative pieces on implementation. for
policy designers, his advice is clear: "design simple, straightforward
7programs that require as little management as possible." His advice
is predicated on a recognition of the complexity of joint action
between organizations
,
the knowledge of a proliferation of actors that
become involved during implementation, and an understanding of the
unique strengths and weaknesses in government, special interest groups,
8
private corporations and individuals. He states, "the most
important approach to solving, or at least ameliorating, this problem
is to design policies and programs that in their basic conception are
able to withstand buffeting by a constantly shifting set of political
9
and social pressures during the implementation phase." Even the
most comprehensive and adaptable design may go astray over the course
of implementation. "The classic symptoms of underperformance, delay,
i 0
and escalating costs are bound to appear."' Bardach contends that
it is necessary to "fix" the game so that divergence does not occur





Various obstacles may arise that demand the at^en^ion of a
"fixer." Pressman and Wildavsky hypothesize in Implementation that
16
any one or all of the following obstacles may affect program
participants during the implementation of new programs:
(1) Direct incompatibility with other commitments.
(2) No direct incompatibility, but a preference for other
programs.
(3) Simultaneous commitments to other projects.
(4) Dependence on others who lack a sense of urgency in
the project.
(5) Differences of opinion on leadership and proper
organizational roles.
(6) Legal and procedural differences.
1
2
(7) Agreement coupled with lack of power.
This would seem to be a useful typology for the classifcation of
problems experienced by implementors in this case study. There is
recognition that case study research in the arena of political science
encounters difficulties in determining discrete variables and, as a
13logical result, is chary of cause-and-effeet statements.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to attempt to define and determine the
process by which a program comes into existence. In this case study,
it may be extremely difficult to measure the outputs of the Airline
Employee Protection Program (much less the outcomes - the effects of
the Program) because of the small passage of time since enactment.
Having developed something of a staff expertise in program
implementation, the author will attempt to highlight analogous
situations of first-hand Knowledge. As a program analyst, the
17
author s f undamental and continuing responsibility was to provide the
Assistant Secretary for Labor Management Relations with alternatives,
options, strategies and recommendations for programs within his
jurisdiction. This experience, which had been gained prior to and
during the author's involvement as a staffer on the Airline Employee
Protection Program (AEPP), served some useful analytical purposes in
differentiating policy analysis from implementation analysis.
"However, it is not enough simply to study these institutional changes
to describe or even explain them. Policy research upon implementation
should be prescriptive in its capacity to suggest means for improving
14
the delivery of services."
In simple terms, the problem to be addressed is, how will all of
the activities necessary to physically put a program in place be
controlled and directed "so as to achieve program oojectives, keep
15
costs down, and reduce delay." Some caveats are in order.
Certain laws are better than others in terms of their technical
completeness, logical coherence and explicit statements of purpose.
Often, an agency will inherit a law, or a portion of a law, that has
been subject to intense deoate and substantial compromise. As such,
it may be dissected, fragmented and completely politicized. Thus, it
is exceedingly difficult to institute workable program machinery that
will meet the expectations of all of the concerned parties. In
addition, "it is impossible to implement well a policy or program that
is defective in its basic theoretical conception. In many
situations tne bureaucracy receives a law tnat possesses neither a
definition of the problem nor an explicit social objective. A law may
18
be faulted by basic social assumptions that are invalid. Other laws
may have been so compromised by various special interest pressure
groups that they contain inherently conflicting objectives. Still
other laws may accomplish their objectives but, nevertheless
,
result
in unanticipated and undesirable side effects that must be dealt with.
A recent paper by Messrs. Montjoy and O'Toole analyzed
implementation irom two perspectives! (1) Is a vague or a specific
mandate provided in the law? and (2) are new and adequate resources
provided by Congress? They develop a matrix on the basis of the
two possible answers to the questions, i.e., vague or specific, yes or
no. These dichotomies yield four integrals which Montjoy and O'Toole
classify as types A, B, C and D. Type A is characterized as having a
vague Congressional mandate and is provided with new resources to
carry it out. Type B has a specific mandate and additional
resources. Type C is vague and receives no new resources. The last
category, type D, is specifically mandated but is not authorized new
1
8
resources to perform its mandate. They propose to predict the
impact of intra-organizational implementation based on the typology
described above. They conclude that "the surest way to avoid
intra-organizational implementation problems is to establish a
specific mandate and provide sufficient resources (type 3). It is
true that we found some start-up problems with type B mandates, but,
at least, there was new activity directed toward an externally
specified goal." They go on to discuss the next, hierarcnical
organizational level.
19
"However, the attractiveness of type B policies is
partially an illusion caused by our concentration on
intr
a
-organizational problems. Inter -organizational
problems arise largely from the difficulty of
coordinating the activities of several different units,
each of which has its own goals and established
routines. The creation of a specialized unit to handle
a type 3 mandate will increase the number of agencies
dealing in a certain area and may increase the
coordination costs for the new mandate and for other,
existing programs. Thus, we have a dilemma: a
solution to an intra-organizationai problem may
exacerbate an inter-organizational problem."20
(Emphasis is in the original).
Additional problems may occur as a result of the creation of sub-units
with overlapping delegations of authority. The following case study will
allude to these organizational difficulties.
One final consideration is that laws may be negative in that they
remedy inequities or the effects of discrimination that have been visited
upon the weakest segments of society, i.e., those elements too
economically ineffective to defend their interests in the unregulated
21
marketplace. These problems may prove intractable m spite ot the
awesome resources that the Federal Government can bring to bear.
As we examine the implementation of the Airline Employee Protection
Program, we might ask some questions ex post facto :
-Was an implementation strategy articulated in the legislation?
-Was an estimate of the required resources made?
-What alternatives were developed? By whom?
-Who was responsible for seeing the law implemented?
-Is the program successful?
These questions should serve as the basis of our case study.
20
Historical Development of Employee Protections in the United States
Commencing in the early 1930's in response to the extremely nigh
unemployment of the Depression, the well-organized rail industry unions
supported rail consolidations in the Emergency Railroad Transportation
Act. From L9 33 to 1936, this Act provided rail workers with basic
employment protection in the form of a job freeze, i.e., no layoffs or
terminations. Due to the expiration of the Act in 1936, the railway
unions and management negotiated the Washington Job Protection Agreement
of 1936. This comprehensive agreement stipulated basic elements of joo
protection, including an adjustment allowance for either separation or
reductions in income due to relocations, as weil as fringe benefits ana
relocation expenses.
Following the Washington Agreement, the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) invoked discretionary authority under its regulatory
responsibility for the railroad industry and required that employee
protections be included in any subsequent mergers or consolidations.
Congress codified this requirement in the Transportation Act of 1940.
Since then, the ICC has had several successive sets of minimum standards
which have provided increased protections to adversely affected employees
in the railroad industry. Today, the " AMTRAK" protections apply to all
proposed rail mergers or consolidations.
AMTRAK (National Railroad Passenger Corporation) was an attempt to
create a profit-guided quasi-private enterprise by salvaging rail
passenger service by assuming the non—profitabie routes or ^ns nationwide
rail systems. It was contained in the Rail Passenger Service Act of
21
1970. Its employee protections stipulated that all rights, benefits ana
privileges required by current collective bargaining agreements be
maintained as well as rights to continue collective bargaining,
employment protection, priority reemployment rights and recompensated
training costs. Coverage was for up to six years, provided an
arbitration procedure favorable to employees and, for the first time,
included COLA (Cost-of-Living Allowance) protection.
As the railroad industry has continued to retrench, employee
protections have grown from ICC-required guidelines to
Congressionally-specif ied provisions. The Regional Rail Reorganization
Act of 1973 created CONRAIL (Consolidated Rail Corporation) in an effort
to reduce government subsidization for certain financially troubled
railroads in the Northeast and increase the competitive conditions for
regional portions of the rail sector of tne transportation industry. Not
only were all of the existing AMTRAK provisions included in the CONRAIL
employee protections section of the 1973 Act out, for the first time in
American industry, the principle of "cradle-to-grave" employment/income
was accepted oy labor, management and the Federal Government, aloeit in a
modified form. If an employee had five years or more of creditable
service as of tne date of enactment, he is guaranteed a joo witn no
reduction in wages or, if laid off, an allowance equaling his average
monthly railroad income until age 65 or upon his eligibility ror
pension. In return for this lifelong protection, the employee agrees to
relocate to wherever jobs in his class or crait are availaole.
Obviously, if no jobs are available, the employee collects his adjustment
allowance nevertheless. This Act, and the Railroad Revitalization and
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Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 cover approximately one-half million
railroad employees and all costs for the employee protections contained
therein are borne by the Federal Government.
The Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 ( UMTA) is a Federal effort
to assist urban areas in maintaining and improving their public
transportation equipment, facilities and services. This is effected by
the U.S. Department of Transportation granting operating assistance or
capital purchase assistance to cities. UMTA, along with the High Speed
Ground Transportation Act of 1965 and the Federal-Aid Highway Act of
1973 » requires the U.S. Department of Labor to certify that "fair and
equitaole" employment conditions, patterned after AMTRAK provisions, have
been agreed to by the public bodies and representatives of the
employees. Or, the DOL may recommend the level of protections if the
employees are unorganized. Thus, the DOL protects the employment
interests of those working for the mass transit systems within the
project service area.
In the airline industry, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) has
interpreted Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act to require the
inclusion of employee protections in all merger proposals. Section 408
mandates the CAB to protect the public's interests. As interpreted by
the CAB, it is in the public's interest to insure the equitable and
reasonable employment conditions of such proposals. The prevailing base
required by the CAB for merger protections are the provisions of the
Allegheny -Mohawk merger of 1972. These provisions stipulate:
(1) "fair and equitable" integration of seniority lists
within the collective bargaining process with final




(2) "displaced" employees, who suffer a reduction in
wages, snail be made whole by the use of a special
allowance for a period not to exceed four years and
initiated within three years of the date of merger.
(3) displaced employees exercise their "bumping" rights at
their home base to regain their former level of
compensation or forfeit their special displacement
allowance
.
(4) "dismissed" employees shall receive 60# of their
previous remuneration (averaged over the last 12 months of
work ) for up to five years unless recalled to work by the
carrier at a comparable level of compensation. The claim
period, as above, is within three years of the date of
merger and may be reduced by other earnings and
unemployment insurance.
(5) that a lump-sum payment of up to one year of pay may
be chosen by the dismissed employee in lieu of all other
rights, privileges and benefits.
(6) that if an employee chooses to relocate within the
surviving carrier's employment structure, all moving
costs, losses involving the sale of a home or the
cancellation of a lease and the costs associated with the
search for a new home, shall be recompensated.
(7) that all fringe benefits snail remain intact and be
protected
.
(8) that the NMB shall provide t.ne final level of dispute
settlement through arbitration beyond the collective
o obargaining agreements in effect.*-^
Ocher recent legislatively-mandated protections are contained in the
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, the Special
Health P.evenue Sharing Act of 1975 and the Developmental Disabilities
Services and Facilities Construction Act amendments (1975)* The thrust
of all three pieces of legislation is to deinstitutionalize to the
maximum extent possible three population classes, i.e., juvenile
offenders, mentally ill persons, and developmental ly disaoled persons
(mentally retarded, victims of cerebral palsy, autism or epilepo^.)-
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In uurn, employees or the institutions charged with protecting and
creating these individuals might suffer job loss and other adverse
effects. Various protections are included in these laws to provide for
job security, retraining and, in general, "fair and equitable" protective
arrangements
.
The irade Act ot 1974 and predecessor statutes established a program
to assist workers adversely affected by foreign imports and the lowering
of U.3. import quotas. This program includes financial assistance (70$
of wages for up to one year if laid off or terminated) and employment
services (job matching, referral and placement services, retraining and
job search and relocation allowances.)
The recently enacted Redwood National Parx Act Amendments of 1978
provides assistance to adversely affected employees of the declining
redwood lumbering industry. These labor protections were legislated to
assist redwood workers who were adversely affected by the purchase of
48,000 acres of prime redwood forests by the U.3. Government tnat were
previously owned by three lumber companies. Job protection coverage is
restricted, timewise, to those employees working (or recently laid off)
on the date of enactment and, geographically, to the two northernmost
counties in the State of California, Humboldt and Santa Rosa Counties.
Any employee of certain "affected employers" who is laid off or otherwise
separated between May 3T, 1977 and September 30 > 1930 is deemed to be an
affected employee by a conclusive presumption as stipulated in the Act.
No determination of individual or specific class impact need be made
beyond the designation of "affected employer." The burden of proof of
the non-existence of adverse impact is shifted from tne individual ot
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company to the federal Government. Beyond this important legalistic
point, the array of benefits for eligible employees is most generous as
judged by previous standards. Benefit payments make the employee whole
(I 00 * 0i i0rrner’ earnings) and, in an effort to encourage redwood workers
to find careers in other industries, it is theoretically possible for an
adversely affected employee to earn 150% of his prior redwood industry
wages by combining his income maintenance allowance and his wages from
his new job. Adjustment assistance in the form of income maintenance and
employment services may be utilized for up to six years. All important
benefits, such as seniority and health, welfare and pension plans, are
maintained. A lump sum severance pay can be elected. Employment
services include preferential hiring in the expanded Redwood National
Park, as well as new skills training, and job search and relocation
allowances
.
After this rather exhausting overview of employee protections, rights
and benefits, one must ask, what is the underlying philosophy? In the
private economic sector, the philosophy represents the concerns of
organized labor for the job security of its consitutencs. It is
recognized as a moral and economic requirement to exchange some of the
benefits gained for all as a result of the change for some of the losses
suffered by the unfortunate dislocated workers. (Incidentally, employee
protections generally applies to existing workers only.) Initially, the
focus was on industries that were either in decline or where automation
was posing a threat to employees' job security. Job security not only
entails the loss of one's job but may also include changes in the basic
character or purposes of one's work so that the new position may require
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new training, may pay less, may provide less hours to wor*, may entail
different or additional responsibilities, may require a shift in
geographical location, or may require other changes that may diminish
one's job status.
Employee protections required by law, as distinguished from those
gained through collective bargaining, are a recognition that changes in
governmental policy may adversely affect specific employees who have
contributed some sizeable portion of their lives to an industry or that
their employment security was based on a given set of assumptions
directly altered by government action. When the government changes those
conditions upon which the assumptions are based, there is a belief that
the affected worker should not bear the impact of the economic
consequences alone. To see one's career swept away, an "investment" of
some number of years cast aside, Congress has felt morally and
politically compelled to assist those workers by sharing the economic
burden with the American taxpayer-at-large
,
or by requiring the industry
wnich is to ce advantaged to share such benefits. For example, in the
case of AMTRAK, railroads which were being relieved of the burden to
provide unprofitable rail passenger service had to provide for the
protection of employees adversely affected in that transaction. This
seems equitable where the society as a whole will benefit due to a policy
change or new legislation that presumably will result in some economic
advantage or social benefit for all. Thus, motivated by a sense of
fairness, Congress returns some of that advantage or benefit to adversely
affected workers in order to ameliorate the disruption and negative
consequences attributable to legislated change.
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On a political level, it is often the price necessary to garner
organized labor’s support for new policy initiatives. However, beyond
that political consideration, there does seem to exist a sincere concern
on the part of a majority of Congress for the welfare of dislocated
workers, their families and the attendant social and economic
ramifications of public-policy innovations. One has made an investment
of one’s life in an industry. If that investment can be considered
property, tnen the argument is an extension, if you will, of the
Constitutional requirement to compensate property interests since the
Constitution requires that private property seized by the government be
compensated for.
Unit ed States Department of Labor’s Role in Employee Protections
The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) has the prime responsibility
within the Executive Branch for the great majority of employee protection
programs. In addition, it is changed with providing guidance tnrough
consultation on employee protections and ensuring "fair and equitable"
protective arrangements with other Executive Departments who have
responsibilities to administer certain laws containing employee
protection provisions.
DOL has three Agencies with major employee protections
responsibilities. The Labor-Management Services Administration (LMSA),
in its Office cf Labor Management Relations Services (LMRS)
,
Division of
Employee Protections (DE?) has responsibility for Section 13(c) of UMTA
(certifications), individual employee claims under the AMTRAK and UMTA
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legislation, Redwood National Park Act (Redwood Employee Protection
Program - repp), Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (Airline Employee
Protection Program - AEPP) and Small Urban and Rural Transit legislation
which, only recently, has been fully Implemented. LMRS has the
Delegation of Authority to act for the Secretary of Labor directly on the
above pieces of legislation and, also, has an additional obligation to
consult with the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) in the
development of protective arrangements for employee protections on the
special Health Revenue Sharing Act of 1975 and the Developmental
Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Act, and tne Attorney
ueneral on uhe Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974.
Tue Hospital Conversion Act was recently signed by the President in
October, 1979- It requires the Secretary of Labor to certify protective
arrangements in much the same manner as in Section 13(c) of UMTA and in
the Small Urban and Rural Transit portion of the Surface Transportation
Act of 1978.
The Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILA3) is responsiole under
tne Trade Act of 1974 for determining whether: certain industries,
companies and/or corporate suodivisions have suffered layoffs; sales
and/or production have been reduced, and, if increased quantities of
imported products have significantly caused the layoffs and reduced
business. This determination is accomplished through investigation and
certification.
The Employment and Training Administration (ETA) has the
responsibility to effect adjustment assistance in cooperation with LMSA
and ILA3. This is accomplished mainly through the U.3. Employment
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Service (ES) and the Unemployment Insurance Program (UI). ES and UI
develop contracts with fifty-two State Employment Seou-ity Agencies
(thus, the acronym - SESA's) for the distribution of funds and the
delivery of employment services to the local level.
This completes the review of the basic structural components and
experiential bases within the DOL for the implementation of new
programs. Mow the author will take a much closer ioox at the recent
implementation Oi a new DOL program - tne Airline Employee Protection
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THE CASE OF AIRLINE EMPLOYES PROTECTIONS
Airline employee protections became a public issue in the
mid-1970's. Not since the creation of the Civil Aeronautics Board in
^33 had such expansive changes been considered by Congress for the air
transportation industry. Under the Chairmanship of John Robson initially
and, most notably, Alfred Kahn, the CAB reversed its protectionist
posture and, in 1975, commenced concentrated efforts to deregulate the
air transportation industry by administrative fiat.
The House Public Works Committee report on H.R. 12622 (Amendments to
the federal Aviation Act, of 1953; alluded to this protectionist
orientation when it stated that the CAB prior to 1975 "tended to place
restrictions on airline management, which gave it much less competitive
freedom than management in other industries. 1,1 The airlines themselves
had grown quite comfortable with this arrangement. Since rates and
schedules were set by the government, the only competition that took
place occurred in superficial areas, i.e., frills. Furthermore, with the
route structure virtually impenetrable to new airlines, normal pressures
O- supply and demand were excluded from the airline marketplace.
Consequently, airline management presented a near-unanimous front in
opposition to deregulation with United Airlines being the sole deserter
from the corporate ranks.
The changes made by the CAB fostered competition by decreasing
economic regulation. By allowing more flexible rescheduling and
rate-setting, these regulatory changes resulted in drastically increased
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public utilization, lower fares for the traveling public, and much higher
profits f or the airline companies. Tnis experience combined with tne
examples of certain highly successful intrastate airlines that were not
subject to CAB approval as well as massive support on the part of
economists fueled the nascent movement towards increased airline
competition. Both Presidents Ford and Carter strongly encouraged
regulatory reform of the highly regulated airline industry. This
structural reform could only have been made possible by continuing the
administrative implementation of deregulation initiated by Robson and
Kahn by other means.
Opponents raised various objections to deregulation. One that
possessed little merit focused on safety. This argument was that
deregulation would reduce safety in America’s commercial airlines because
of new competitors (presumably not as safety-oriented ) , old and
unairworthy aircraft, and untrained personnel. All of tnese aspects of
the flight environment are regulated by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), whose responsibilities (among others) it is to
issue and enforce "rules, regulations, and minimum standards relating to
tne manufacture, operation, and maintenance of aircraft as well as the
rating and certification (including medical) of airmen and the
certification of airports serving air carriers certified by the Civil
2
Aeronautics Board." There could be no lessening of either the scope
or the degree of the FAA'
s
mandate without separate legislation and
considerable public discussion. Safety regulation is beneficial to ail -
the airlines, the unions, the communities, the public. Economic
regulation, on the otner hand, may only be beneiicial to certain vested
interests. This seemed to be the case in the airline industry.
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In fairness, the direction of the impact of economic deregulation
depends upon tne perspective. The allusion here is to small
communities. A recent example reported in the Washington Post describes
tne tnroes of identity that Bakersfield, California has been going
through. United Airlines wants to drop its service to Bakersfield wnile
Air Pacific, a commuter airline, wants to pick it up. As a matter of
"civic pride" Bakersfield has gone to court complaining that it has been
"virtually removed" from the air transport system by United's pulling
out, and that the CAB has failed to meet its obligation in assuring
communities "essential" air service. These pull-outs have, in turn,
"sparked widespread fears that affected communities might simply shrivel
up and die - unable to attract new businesses or even retain their
4
existing economic base." What the Airline Deregulation Act provides
is a guarantee of essential air service for up to ten years even if that
means requiring an airline that cannot find a replacement to continue
providing service on a money-losing route. These types of problems
surfaced and received extensive review during the lengthy hearings
preceding the formulation of the legislation.
However, it was for Congress to develop the legislation and to reach
agreement on the specific provisions within the environment of the public
forum. Separate legislation was developed in each House of Congress as a
means to prevent any erosion in the deregulation successes already
achieved, and to continue deregulation in the face of potential changes
of CAB membership and/or policies. In addition, legislation would
preclude any reversals of deregulation by the judiciary. Tne Senate
process covered several years, whereas the House involvement, especially
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in the employee protections’ area, was of much shorter duration-
Accordingly, we will commence with an examination of the Senate.
The United States Senate
The move to deregulate the U.S. airline industry in the Senate was an
exercise in determination and compromise. Elizabeth Bailey, a Civil
Aeronautics Board member, recently commented that the Senate hearings
accompanying the airline deregulation bill were especially enlightened by
the use of massive and intensive economic analyses accompanied with
statistically quantified supporting data."5 This was especially true in
the Senate hearings before Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on
Administrative Practice and Procedure, and Senator Cannon's Commerce,
Science, and Transportation Committee. Two significant bodies of data,
heretofore unavailable, provided a portion of empirical validation for
the proposed legislation. first, there was an abundant amount of data
regarding the recently applied deregulatory edicts of the CAB. The
positive results of these limited administrative measures were manifest
for all to consider- Second, certain provisions of the Senate bill
concerning deregulation of domestic all-cargo service had been separated
from an airline deregulation bill presented in 1977* The former
provisions involved three all-cargo carriers (flying Tiger, Seaboard
World and Airlift) and several all-cargo "commuter" carriers, such as
federal Express. These provisions were included in n-R- 6010 in October
1977 and were subsequently reported out of the House-Senate Conference
and signed into law by tne President on 9 November 197 7 - Incidentally,
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it should be no^ed chat this legislation contained no employee protection
provisions. Nevertneless, the performance improvement in the all-cargo
business was further evidence for minimizing regulation in the industry.
ihe x oilowing synopsis oi early senate activity is necessarily brief
because there was virtually no consideration of employee protections in
the initial movement to deregulate the American airline industry.
Bipartisan eiicr^s to reform the CAB go back to t'ne Ford Administration.
Senator Cannon initiated legislation on the topic (S. 689) and Senator
Kennedy, while having no jurisdiction over airline regulatory reform,
highlighted the issue by presiding over oversight hearings before the
Administrative Practice Subcommittee. The Kennedy hearings were
concluded in 1975 and resulted in an eight volume transcript of testimony
titled, appropriately enough, the Kennedy Hearings . These hearings were
condensed into the "Kennedy Report." 0 In addition, President Ford
initiated researcn in the U.S. Department of Transportation and at the
CAB that served as the basis for his legislative proposals (S. 29 2) to
Congress. The Carter Administration continued the marshalling of
political forces to ensure passage, as well as strengthening and further
refining the pro-deregulation arguments. Such groups as the Ad Hoc
Committee for Airline Regulatory Reform provided penetrating analyses and
served as a focus for proponents of deregulation. This Committee
7
contained a very wide range of conservative and liberal entities.
Senator Cannon (D-Nev.) commenced hearings in 1976 in the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. These hearings
lasted two years until October 27 > 1977 when the Committee reported out
S. 2493 1 the Air Transportation Regulatory Reform Act ot 1978. In the
37
beginning, the focus was on amending the Federal Aviation Act of 1958;
however, as the reformist perspective continued to enlarge and the
momentum continued to grow, the title continued to change until at the
time of its enactment, it was known as the Airline Deregulation Act of
1973. This was a period of intense scrutiny and debate. Senator Cannon,
the committee Chairman, stated, "(t)he committee met more than 20 times
to mark up a bill before voting 13 to 3 to send this legislation to the
9oena^e." Tnis may have been a record number of mark-ups. Senator
Pearson (R-Kan.) commented, "I cannot recall any bill that has received
closer and more extended consideration by the full committee." 10
The . irs u suggestion or an employee protections provision being
included in the bill was made in mid-October, 1977 by Senator Danforth
(R-Mo.). While to some it may seem ideologically incongruous for a
Midwestern Republican Senator to introduce legislation designed to
directly benefit the interests of labor; nevertheless, it was a
politically sound judgment on his part. It so happens that the main
overhaul and repair facility and other operations for Trans World
Airlines (TWA) are located in Kansas City, Missouri and support a
workforce of approximately 11,200 people. TWA is the most economically
vulnerable of the "Big Four" airlines (United, American, Eastern and TWA)
in terms of its debt-equity ratio. To compound TWA's fiscal problems,
the average age of the airline's fleet of aircraft is approaching
retirement and replacement equipment will be needed in the near future.
Securing loans in today's high interest economy could further weaken the
company (if it can secure financing at all.) This economic weakness
could result in numerous route closings, or in the worst case, bankruptcy
3d
for XwA in an unregulated environment where TWA would be susceptible to
increased competition on its profitable routes from smaller but
economically healthier airlines and decreasing governmental subsidization
on its small city routes. Additional uncertainties might occur during a
forced merger attempt.
Such an attempt was recently witnessed. Texas International and Pan
American Airlines vied for control of National Airlines for two reasons:
(1) a modern aircraft inventory; and (2) extensive north-south domestic
routes. Thus, it was one of Senator Danfortn’s prime concerns to assure
the economic welfare of employees in case large-scale dislocations were
suffered by TWA.
oenator Danforth voiced his reservations (specifically regarding what
he considered to be less favorable treatment of certain airlines purely
on the basis of size) in his attached comments to the Committee report
where he wrote, "(t)he original version of this bill caused me serious
concern. I j.eit that substantial damage might be caused to certain
airlines, resulting in the loss of thousands of jobs including many in my
ov;n State of Missouri . As Sentor Inouye (D-Hawaii) observed in
reacting to the proposal for automatic market entry:
"Should automatic market entry become law, carriers in
precarious financial condition could very well become
bankrupt. Among other carriers, cut-throat competition
could force large-scale employee cutbacks and other
disruptions.
In either event, because of the airline seniority
system it would be impossible for employees to shift
from one airline to another and retain their wage and
benefit status
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If enactment of this legislation would cause the
instability many including myself fear it would, the
hardship will not only be felt by airline industry
employees.
In addition to pilots - flight attendants, dispatchers,
mechanics, ticket agents, clerical workers, and others
will suffer as well
That supporters of the legislation recognize the very
real possibility of these consequences is, I believe,
evidenced by adoption in Committee of an 'employee
protection' amendment. That amendment is intended to
compensate airline employees who are deprived of their
employment as a result of an airlines 's bankruptcy or
other financial difficulty which would necessitate a
reduction in its labor force.
To me, all of the risks I have discussed are
unacceptable ... "12
And, thus, Senator Inouye stated his opposition to the legislation.
An important consideration in addition to deregulation that weighed
on the airlines was the possibility of a repetition of the 1973 oil
embargo that could again threaten severe cutbacks in service which might
13
result in massive layoffs. However, for the most part, the committee
did not factor this variable into their development of employee
protections
.
At the outset there was unanimous union resistance to airline
deregulation. The major unions representing employees in the airline
industry are the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA), Plight Engineers'
International Association (FEIA), Transport Workers Union (TWU),
Association of Flight Attendants (AFA) , International Association of
Machinists ( IAM)
,
Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks (BRAG),
AFL-CIO, and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT). The body
of law that governs union-management arrangements and collective
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bargaining processes in the airline industry is the National Railway
Laoor Act.. This law does not require employee protections as a federal
minimum standard. Only employee protections contained in collective
bargaining agreements or merger agreements (as required by the CAB) are
applicable. These protections were discussed extensively in Chapter I.
As recognition and acceptance of the concept of employee protections grew
in Congress during the development of the legislation, most airline union
opposition gradually fell by the wayside. But while the concept: of
employee protections was eventually accepted, the form and degree of this
assistance was the topic of lively and high-pitched committee debate.
Strong exception was taken by Senator Zorinsky (D-Neb.) to the final form
of tne committee’s recommendation on labor protection:
"Concern for this type of dislocation of airline
employees has been the major stimulus for certain
airline employee organizations to seek labor protection
provisions, or oppose the legislation. Because of this
pressure such provisions were drafted.
There is no disagreement with the Committee as to the
probable nexus between the dislocation and this
legislation.
The initial threshold that must be logically crossed is
whether or not the dislocation probably caused by this
legislation merits any labor protection. As the
Committee report persuasively articulates, there is
precedent for protective provisions, but the precedents
are however, analogous only to those provisions
defeated by the 8-6 vote, not to what is proposed by
the Committee. Therefore, the only disagreement is the
remedy that is to be afforded the dislocated
employee . "-‘• 4
Senator Zorinsky had proposed a "last fired, first hired" preferential
hiring policy a3 the all-inclusive employee protections without any
Federal financial assistance. This was the provision defeated by the 8
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to 6 vote. With Federal assistance as stipulated by the committee’s
approved provision on employee protections, he estimated the potential
cost in the case of a bankruptcy at one billion dollars. He termed this
a raid on the treasury." ^ However, in a masterful political move,
the proponents of financial assistance to dislocated workers co-opted
much of Senator Corinsky's substitute by simply including preferential
hiring as an additional principle in the complete employee protections
package.
The format and principal provisions on employee protections that
eventually passed the committee became the model for the full Senate
bill, the joint House-Senate Conference report, and the enacted
legislation. They were based on the assumption that employment
opportunities would increase throughout the industry when it
deregulated
.
Furthermore, the seasonal and cyclical nature of
industry was considered. Thus, the committee members wanted to guarantee
payment of monetary compensation only in those situations that were
directly and without question dislocations attributable to the change in
the airline regulatory scheme, as opposed to dislocations resulting from
any other factors, such as general economic downturns, fuel shortages,
and so on. Thus, the committee defined a "qualifying dislocation" as
either a bankruptcy or a "major contraction" in an individual airline's
total employment. A "major contraction" was defined as a layoff of at
least 15 % of a carrier’s full time employees in any twelve month period.
This layoff had to be a result of the change in the regulatory structure
as specifically determined by the CA3. Strike-related layoffs as well as
strikers would be ineligible for CAB determination.
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The Department of Labor would have express responsibility for
conducting the program. Only full-time empioyees with four or more years
Oi service as of the date of enactment of the ADA were eligible: if
impacted, these employees could collect monthly payments for 36 months.
Ihis program was limited to a basic ten year eligibility period,
employees found eligible during that period could receive up to 36 months
or monetary benefits. If an adversely affected employee was declared
eligible on the last day of the ten year eligibility period, and he or
she could not find work in the industry, the employee's protected period,
xn this situation, could extend for 3b months beyond the ten year
eligibility period. The program's eligibility period was limited to ten
years in order to define the transition from a fully regulated condition
to a completely competitive environment that was fully exposed to the
rigors and the impacts of tree market forces. This was in keeping with
the spirit exhibited by other transitional safeguards contained in the
oill for carriers and small communities. It was the 15% trigger and the
accompanying CAB determination which insured that only the effects of
deregulation would prompt the payment of any benefits.
Once declared eligible under a qualifying dislocation, an adversely
affectec employee could take advantage of a range of benefits including
priority hiring, moving expenses and reimbursement for any losses
incurred by the change of residences, in addition to the monthly
assistance payments. Any protected employee who suffered a loss due to
tne reduction of his wages would receive partial compensation for the
difference between his prior and current wages. The Secretary of Labor,
after consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, would be
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responsible for setting the percentages and amounts of monetary
compensation for each class and craft of airline worker. "The committee
intends that the percentages chosen will result in compensation payments
bhat are less tnan the employee’s after-tax income in order to preserve
maximum incentives iOr employees to secure comparable work." 1 ^
However, m the body of Section 22 (b) (1), the committee stipulated
"that the protected employee will not, during the period in which he is
entitled to protection, be placed in a substantially worse financial
position with respect to wages and fringe benefits." 1 ' Although not
exactly contrary, these two positions reflect the difference in
approaches between various factions. This lack of definitive guidance
would subsequently prove difficult to interpret during the implementation
stage. In addition, the Secretary of Labor would be required to
periodically publish a list of jobs in aviation-related industries to
augment preferential hiring. This reference to aeronautically-related
18industries is contained in the committee’s report. ' This report is a
prime source for determining the fundamental philosophy that prevailed in
the committee and the legislative intent on an issue-by-issue basis.
To further illustrate the Senate posture, it is useful to review the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis of major issues:
"It is highly unlikely that any payments wiLl be
necessary under this provision, and therefore no cost
has been included in this estimate. A dislocation of
the required magnitude has been historically rare in
the airline industry. While the change in the
regulatory environment will result in some changes in
the nature of the industy, there is no evidence that
major dislocations will occur. Rather, the opportunity
for greater pricing and service flexibility is likely
to result in increases in airline traffic and in the
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number of airline jobs. Further, the carefully
structured transition period should allow the existing
carriers to adapt gradually to the new environment . "19
As with the committee, the CBO concludes that it is highly improbable
that dislocations resulting from deregulation would be of such a
dimension as to trigger payments. However, the CBO did perform a ratner
perfunctory cost analysis anyway. As an example, it estimated a 20£
reduction in work force for three sizes of carriers - large trunx, small
trunk, and local service. The potential government liability would be 30
?0
million, 9 million, and 3 million dollars, respectively.
In addition to the labor protective section, some of the other
highlights of S. 2493 are enumerated below:
(1) A new policy declaration for the CAB stressing
competition, innovation and low cost.
(2) Automatic market entry in a phased transition
without prior CA3 approval; the burden of proof
was shifted to opponents to prove that new route
applications by competitors are not consistent
with the public convenience and necessity (PCN).
(3) New guidelines on public convenience and necessity
(PCN)
.
(4) Market exit from unprofitable routes after ninety
days if substitute air service is available.
(5) Fare increases up to five percent and decreases to
thirty-five percent without CAB approval (later
changed to fifty percent.)
(6) Small cities that currently have air service or on
which there is dormant authority are guaranteed
continued service for ten years.
(7) A new class of local air carriers was created that,
could utilize aircraft of up to 36 passenger seats
and 40,000 pounds maximum gross weight.
(3) Streamlined and expedited CAB hearings.
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S. 2493 was reported out of the Senate Commerce, Science, and
Transportation Committee on 27 October 1977 and sene to the Senate floor.
tor no la^er ^han 4:00 p.m. on April 20e'n. Senator Cannon introduced the
bill, discussed its evolution, and set the array of pro and con forces
who were either urging passage or defeat. Considerable controversy
followed on a range of subjects, including employee protections. Senator
Pearson commented in part
:
’’Throughout this process, airline labor has almost
unanimously opposed the passage of this legislation.
They contend that the bill will result in contractions
among certain carriers and therefore result, in fewer
jobs... I find little merit in (that) argument.
Increased traffic generation through more moderate
fares and access to new markets will enhance employment
opportunities . . . The Nation's airline employees are
among the most nighly trained ana well paid of any
group of employees in the American labor force. In my
judgment, there is nothing in tnis legislation that in
any way tnreatens their relative position in the
marketplace. .
.
Should the merger of a failing carrier oecome
necessary, there is ample precedent at the CA3 for the
imposition of extensive labor protective provisions in
such cases including such benefits as moving expenses,
seniority list integration and mandatory binding
arbitration. In short, existing practice and procedure
adequately protects the airline labor force and the
travel:' public in cases where a particular carrier
The Senator's last point regarding the CAB protecting airline employees
through the use of merger protections may not oe entirely fair. Nhile
historically the CAB has allowed a failing airline to merge with a
competitor, tnere is no guarantee of that policy continuing. Quite to
the contrary, during his tenure, CAB Chairman Kahn strongly resisted




mergers on tne grounds that they were monopolistic in tendency and
aestructive of the competitive framework that he was attempting to
fashion. So to assume that all dislocated workers of a failing
carrier would receive mandatory CAB merger protections is spurious. it
is just as possible that a failing airline would be allowed to go into
receivership and tnat its employees would be eligible for nothing more
than standard employment services and unemployment insurance. Even if a
merger were to be approved, seniority list integration is an extremely
important and sensitive issue as recently demonstrated in the Pan
American-National merger. Pan Am has had pilots on furlough for up to
~en years, but the relatively new National pilots with considerably less
seniority than their Pan Am counterparts were allowed to continue to
fly. Now, if any new positions open for pilots, the old furloughed pan
Am pilots will be called back to work.
Senator McGovern (D-S.D.) was critical of many points in the
legislation. Being from South Dakota, he obviously was very concerned
about air service to small cities. Also, he proceeded to attack the bill
from another quarter that bears on employee protections: that, at a time
when the Administration was proposing an $11 billion public services job
bill to comDat unemployment, it was also supporting S. 2493, a bill that
Senator McGovern purported would put airline employees out of work.
"Proponents of this legislation may well quarrel with
tnese projections, but the fact is that they do not
know - and there is no data available - to determine
the full adverse effect of this legislation upon the
Nation's airline employees.
The employee protection program in S. 2493 signals that
the sponsors of this legislation are aware that there
will be layoffs, but it does not - and cannot - fill in
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uhe numbers or the costs involved. It is a sad
commentary on this bill when we find ourselves
providing unemployment benefits for an unknown number
of people, in an amount that we cannot quantify, at a
time when we are desperately trying to find ways to put
people to work.
Senator McGovern indeed recognized problems that would continue to plague
the employee protection program during implementation. The fact that
three years of Senate hearings and untold research could not even
generally estimate the impact of deregulation in terms of adverse
consequences for airline employees due to airline bankruptcies or
'-ontrac t ions was testimony to the seemingly insoluble nature of the
dilemma . It would fall upon the Department of Labor as the implementing
agent to make those estimates out of necessity.
During the course of the Senate floor debate on protections, the only
amendment accepted by the Senate was that offered by Senator Cannon to
delete the language which specifically protected an employee from being
placed in a "substantially worse financial position." It was felt that
this phrase obligated the Secretary of Labor to pay the full amount of
present salaries and fringe benefits. Many worried that this would be an
excessive payout of tax dollars, expecially since the management of
Northwest Orient Airlines which was involved in a pilots' strike at the
time had advertised nationally in newspapers that some of its pilots
currently were receiving over $100,000 annually in total compensation
24(salary and fringe benefits) and were on strike for more. (According
to the Airline Pilots Association which represents virtually all of the
pilots and many of the flight engineers in the airline industry, the
average member pilot's earnings in 1976 were $41,500 per annum and only
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one percent of ALPA's membership of 27,000 earned in excess of $75,000
annually. Generally, these are management pilots who fly and also hola
senior management positions.) By deleting this language, Senator Cannon
indicated that he felt that "the Secretary of Labor,...., is the one who
ought to make the determination as to the adjustment assistance which is
25provided." In providing further guidance, Senator Cannon stated his
support of incorporating the "last fired, first hired" concept as a means
of keeping people working. He conceded, however, that this would create
problems between the involved unions, obviously referring to the
potential problems surrounding the integration of union seniority lists,
union jurisdictional disputes and disruptive rehiring procedures.
Employee protections were not the centerpiece of debate because no
one thought that they would ever be needed.
"I must say that I do not think we are going to have
those kinds of disruptions. I believe this is merely a
provision where some might say it is adequate
insurance. I believe we have a bill here wnich will
insure that we will end up with more employees for
these various carriers rather than fewer, and that will
be true right across the board. "^ D
This belief was in accordance with the CB0 analysis and other prior
comments and reveals what can be construed as the Senate's intention of
establishing a "contingency" program. No one was definitely sure
employee protections either would or would not be needed. Thus,
provision for employee protections appears to have been political
insurance
.
Other amendments, offered but not accepted, included one by Senator
Zorinsky which would have eliminated the 15$ requirement lor a majoi
contraction and extended coverage to employees with only one year of
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service. However, the amendment
provided otixy for a preferential
for eligible employees, and a duty
certified carriers. The voce on
eliminated all monetary benefits and
right to employment within the industry
*'° ^ re those employees on the part of
the Zorinsky amendment was 43 yeas and
48 nays.
Senator Danfortn, who introduced the original protective provision
contained m the bill, also proposed an amendment to the protections
which did not prevail. Lixe the Zorinsky amendment, it provided for the
elimination of the 152 requirement for a major contraction. The
amendment also extended the employee’s protective period to a maximum of
5 /ears and placed the definition of "reasonably comparable employment"
witn the secretary of Labor. The vote on Senator Danforth's amendment
was 37 yeas and 54 nays.
Senator Hatch (R-Utah) took strong issue with the whole concept of
employee protections. He felt it represented a dangerous trend to single
out special groups for benefits and make the U.S. Government tne last
recourse for employment dislocations. He raised previously enacted
legislation to demonstrate his point - Redwoods, AMTRAK and CONRAIL - and
their costs. Then Senator Hatch placed his amendment before the Senate
to af t irm that ''it is the policy of the United States not to approve
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employee protection programs."' Senators Kennedy and Cannon spoxe in
opposition to the amendment. Subsequently, the amendment was defeated by
a vote of 7 yeas and 85 nays with 8 Senators not voting.
Actually, it appears that many of these amendments were posturing for
later positions or for the purpose of assessing the strengths of the
various factions in anticipation of the final Senate vote. A vote was
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called on the same day and S. 2493 was passed by a vote of 83 yeas and 9
nays. T.oose voting against the bill were Senators Chiles (Florida),
Hatfield, Paul G. (Montana), Inouye (Hawaii), Matsunaga (Hawaii), Melcher
(Montana), Nunn (Georgia), Randolph (West Virginia), Stone (Florida), and
Talrnadge (Georgia). Indications are that the Senate delegations from
Montana, Hawaii, Florida, Georgia and West Virginia feared a detrimental
impact upon air service to towns and small cities in their respective
states and were not persuaded by safeguarding provisions included in the
Senate bill. Nevertheless, the weight of the votes in favor of passage
carried the day in a resounding victory.
The United States House of Representatives
As alluded to earlier, the House of Representatives did not conduct
nearly as lengthy a deoate on the Airline Deregulation Act of 1973 nor on
the employee protections clause as did the Senate. In the House, airline
deregulation was discussed in the 1977 Anderson Hearings . House Aviation
Subcommittee Chairman Anderson (D-Calif.) originally offered H.R. 8813
without any employee protections. During the 1977 Christmas recess, H.R.
8813 was substantially altered to incorporate the divergent views of
several committee members. Key people in these revisions were
Representative Levitas (D-Ga.) and Representative Mineta (D-Calif.). The
product was a new bill, H.R. 11145, which, however, still did not contain
any labor protections. After holding hearings on March 6th and 7th with
Rep. Anderson acting as the bill's manager, the Aviation Subcommittee of
the House Public Works and Transportation Committee commenced mark-up of
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H.R. 1114b on 3 March 1978. During this public mark-up session, Mr.
Mineta recognized the need for labor protections and embarked upon
developing employee protections language. The International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) had proposed certain
protections language in their earlier testimony which had as its basis
une protections provided in tne railroad industry. The Machinists stood
to be the most adversely impacted union if any airline, such as TWA,
suffered major contractions or bankruptcy.
On March 21st, the following amendment (#30A) was offered to tne
subcommittee oy Rep. Mineta:
"Sec. 31. No authority granted by this Act, or by
any amendment made by this Act, shall be exercised by
any carrier unless prior to each such exercise, the
Secretary of Labor has certified to the Civil
Aeronautics Board tnat the interests of the employees
who may be affected thereby have been adequately
projected by fair and equitable arrangements providing
levels of protection no less beneficial to and
protective of such interests than those established
pursuant to section 5(2) (f) of the Interstate Commerce
Act and section 405 of the Rail Passenger Service Act
as in existence to date or hereafter amended except
that the carrier employer of the affected employees
shall be responsible for the application of the
protective arrangements to such employees and shall be
reimbursed by the Secretary of the Treasury for the
cost of such application. There is hereby established
in the Treasury of the United States a separate account
to be xnown as the 'Airlines Employees Protective
Account. ' Funds in such account shall be available to
the Secretary of the Treasury to make reimbursements
pursuant to this section. There is authorized to be
appropriated to such account annually such funds as may
be required to meet the obligations thereunder."
"Section 5(2) (f) of tne Interstate Commerce Act and section 405 of the
Rail Passenger Service Act" refer to the "AMTRArC" level of protections.
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This amendment was subsequently passed in the Subcommittee by a vote of
23 yeas and 1 nay. The 1 nay vote was a proxy.
In spite of this apparent agreement on the protective provision, the
next day, March 22, saw a substitute bill proposed by Rep. Levitas. It
was a collection of many amendments, some of the orignial provisions and
two new sections, i.e., (1) Sunset Provisions (for the termination of the
Civil Aeronautics Board and the transfer of remaining functions that had
not been phased out to other government agencies) and (2) employee
Protections, which read as follows:
"Sec. 13 . Not later than the one-hundred-eightieth day
after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary
of Labor shall prescribe regulations to insure
protection of the interests of employees who are
adversely affected by new competition resulting from
the amendments to the Federal Aviation Act of 1953 made
by this Act. The carrier employer of the affected
employees shall be responsible for the actual payment
of all allowances, expenses, and costs provided to
protect employees pursuant to such regulations. Such
carrier employer shall then be reimoursed for the
actual amounts paid to or for the benefit of protected
employees. Such reimbursement shall be made from a
separate account maintained in the Treasury of the
United States to be known as the 'Airlines Employees
Protective Account.' There is authorized to be
appropriated to such account annually such funds as may
be required to meet the obligations thereunder."
In a surprise move, the Subcommittee passed the Levitas suostitute by a
vote of 13 to 11. At this point, the Subcommittee had both the original
bill and the substitute under consideration. It appears that Rep.
Levitas was attempting to seriously expand the deregulatory aspects of
the initial legislation by completely eliminating the CAB as were others
in the Georgia Congressional delegation. Due to this confusion, Chairman
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Anderson recessed the Subcommittee in order to facilitate private
negotiations to reconcile the differences.
The Subcommittee was reconvened in early May after receiving the
Senate bill, S. 2493, on 20 April 1973. Little was accomplished with tne
Senate bill. Having reconciled the various positions and having achieved
a consensus, the Subcommittee did not want: to recess again and attempt to
include S. 2493 in their considerations. With the reconciliation of H.R.
1x14s and the Levitas Substitute, the synthesis was renumbered H.R. 12611
and reported out of the Subcommittee with approval on May 9th. At this
juncture, the bill contained one Mineta language unchanged on employee
protections
.
Rep. Johnson (D-Calif.), tne Chairman of the House Public Works and
Transportation committee, wanted to link the deregulation bill to two
ocner aviation-related pieces of legislation, H.R. 3729 and H.R. 11936,
that were designed to financially assist airline companies and airport
operators to comply with new En /ironmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
f.nA regulations requiring quieter aircraft and the development of noise
control programs. The deregulation bill (H.R. 12611), as reported out of
the Subcommittee
,
was not explicitly linked to the aviation noi 3 e
abatement legislation although a continuing effort was made by members of
the House to link passage of one with passage of the other. - This
efiort died in the joint House-Senate Conference when the Senate members
refused the linkage. By attempting this linkage, the airlines and the
airports sought offsetting Federal assistance for noise control as the
price of passage of the deregulation legislation.
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Or. 15 May 1978
,
the full House Public Works and Transportation
Committee approved the compromise airline deregulation bill with minor
alterations by a vote of 37 to 5. Sixty amendments had been considered
by the Aviation Subcommittee and the full Public Works Committee. No
changes were made in the Mineta language on employee protections. The
Dili tnen went to the Rules Comraiccee where it was granted an open rule
providing for one hour of general debate. Subsequently, it was reported
° Ut on Aagust 15 " n * After another month, H.R. 12611 (now named the Air
Service Improvement Act of 1973) was taken up by the full House on 14
September 1973 as a Committee of the Whole House on tne State of tne
Union. Although extensive floor discussion ensued in support of the
bill, no speciiic discussion of the employee protections occurred. On
September 21st, again as a Committee of the Whole, the House discussed
H.R. 12611. (3y convening the Committee of the Whole, Congress spreads
any detrimental consequences that might result from a regular Committee
vote among the entire House of Representatives.) In any case, section 34
(renumbered fron section 31 but containing the Mineta AMTRAK protections
in identical language) was passed without objection. The full House was
convened on H.R. 12511 on the same day and the bill was passed py a vote
of 363 yeas to 8 nays. Shortly thereafter, both the House and tne Senate
bills were sent to a joint House-Senate conference to reconcile the two
pieces of legislation and produce a single bill for both Houses to pass
and send to the President.
5b
congressional Intent - the Joint House-Senate Conference
A strange thing occurred during the Conference. ^hile there were
great differences in scope and objectives between the Senate and the
nouse Pills, the Senate bill was generally considered to be the stronger
deregulation effort. What resulted from the Conference turned out to be
stronger than either of the two proposals that went into the Conference.
T.nis phenomenon occurred in a Conference containing most of the
principal actors from the Senate and the House: Senators Cannon,
Magnuson, Stevenson, Ford, Stevens, Schmitt and Danforth: and
Representatives Johnson, Roberts, Anderson, Roncalio, Levitas, Harsha,
ana Snyder. Several factors may have precipitated this stiffened
pro-competitive attitude. First, an intelligent and knowledgeable staff
attorney had recently left the CAB where he had formulated a number of
deregulatory measures under Chairman Kahn and moved to the Senate staff
where he ended up redrafting much of the Conference report. Second,
large increases in airline ridership measured by such parameters as
revenue passenger miles, load factors, available seat miles flown, as
well as airline industry earnings, were seen as a confirmation of
Chairman Kahn’s philosophy of having applied administrative deregulation
to the industry in the recent past. Incidentally, these same profits had
the political side effect of eliminating any possibility of Rep. Johnson
convincing the Senate conferees that the airlines needed financial
assistance in retrofitting older aircraft engines or purchasing new
quieter equipment, thus losing his battle to link the two pieces of
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legislation. 29 Third, a national consensus seemed to be developing
generally favoring fiscal conservatism, free interaction of market forces
and control of inflation.
S ’ 249i ani H * R * 12611 were considered during three Conference
sessions - September 29th, October 5th and October 6th. The
Congressional conferees approved the compromise legislation on October
otn. Immediately thereupon, they referred the legislation bacx to their
respective Chambers for immediate action.
Th- Conference Report, titled the "Airline Deregulation Act of 1973"
amended the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 by substituting a new policy
statement, drastically altering and curtailing the regulatory authority
of the CAB, and scheduling the CAS for gradual, but eventual, elimination
by 1 January 1985. It established the goal of freeing the domestic
airline industry from expensive and stultifying regulations while
stimulating competition and growth.
Prior to the 1973 Act, CA3 authority extended into several areas:
(1) granting of authority to airlines to enter or exit routes and
markets
; v 2) approval of passenger fares
; ( 3 ) confer r i.ng antitrust
immunity upon airline mergers or takeovers; and, (4) administering
subsidies to airlines for maintaining local passenger and airmail service
to small cities. In a series of steps, the new law eliminated: CAB's
route assignment authority by 31 December 1981 (thereafter allowing
virtually automatic market entry or contingent exit); CAB's authority
over domestic rates, fares and charges on 1 January 1933 (thereupon
allowing market forces to dictate pricing); the Board's special authority
over mergers and acquisitions by 1 January 1983 (transfering
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jurisdictional authority to the antitrust laws that apply to other
non-re gulated U.S. industries); and, the CAB as a legal body by 1 January
1985 (transfering its residual powers to other existing agencies.)
Furthermore, new air carriers could come into existence simply by showing
that they are "fit, willing and able" before an abbreviated informal
hearing. As previously mentioned, the compromise was modeled upon S.
2493. However, many of its basic tenets were considerably strengthened.
Of particular interest to this study is the evolutionary development of
the employee protection provision in the Conference.
As discussed previously, the House bill provided airline employees
the protections afforded employees under the Rail Passenger Service Act
(AMTRAK). The existing AMTRAK protections attempt to make dislocated
workers "whole" by providing employee displacement, dismissal and
relocation allowances for up to six years, or allow the employee to elect
a lump sum settlement of up to twelve months pay in lieu of ail other
benefits. The Senate bill provided for a program of employment and
financial assistance that was not to exceed 36 months of payments and was
caused by bankruptcy or a 1556 reduction in total full-time employees
within a twelve month period as a result of this legislation as
determined by the CAB.
Several compromises occurred. Senator Cannon had not wanted to
abolish the airlines Mutual Aid Pact (MAP) which the House had included
in its version of the legislation. So he "got the conferees to agree to
trade some provisions in the labor protection provision for a provision
that would allow the CAB to approve a mutual aid pact under which 60
percent of an airline's expenses during the strike period would be paid
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lor eight weeks if all members of the pact agree in advance to submit to
binding arbitration."^ What he traded away to get the modified MAP
was the 15% trigger for a "qualified dislocation" for a 7 1/2% trigger
and, instead of a 36 month assistance period, he opted for a 72 month
assistance period (as AMTRAK provides.) The 7 1/2% trigger is a much
more reasonable figure if compared to the historical downturns in the
airline industry. The worst economic downturn (not including strikes)
occurred in response to the oil embargo in 1973 and then the size of tne
layoffs amounted to a little over 7% at the hardest hit airline, TWA.
The six year limit is more in keeping with the AMTRAK level of benefits,
as well as practical experience witn furloughs since 1973* According to
ALPA, only Eastern and Pan American Airlines still have pilots on
furlough. These changes notwithstanding, the House and Senate conferees
basically adopted the Senate protective arrangements.
In addition to the changes described above, the Conference bill
provided that protected employees who are furloughed or terminated -
other than "for cause" which abrogates all rights or benefits under the
program - have the first right of hire over non-protected employees with
any airline hiring new employees. Further, it provided that if a
protected employee is hired by another air carrier, that employee shall
retain his rights of seniority and recall with his original furloughing
carrier. However, in no way does this affect any rights employees may
have as a matter of contract. (All aspects of status and pay result from
the sacrosanct principle of seniority in the airline industry.)
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The. conferees intend the requirement that thedeprivation of employment be related to the
Deregulation Act to be a continuing requirement. For
example, an employee who begins to receive benefits andthen reaches mandatory retirement age would not be
eligible for benefits beyond the date he reached
retirement age. After that date the cause of
unemployment would not be the Deregulation Act, but the
reaching of retirement age. "31
Tne last item added on by the conferees stipulated that the Secretary of
Laoor promulgate all rules, regulations and guidelines within six months
after enactment. These regulations would then be submitted to the Senate
Commerce Committee and the House Public Dorics Committee. These final
rules or regulations would become effective sixty legislative days later
unless during that time "either House adopts a resolution stating that
that House disapproves such rules or regulations."^ 2 Therein lies a
serious question as to the constitutionality of a Congressional review of
Executive action following enactment of a piece of legislation. This
question will be addressed later.
And, thus, the Conference Report went back to the two Houses of
Congress. The Senate passed the measure on 14 October 1978 on a vote of
32 yeas and 4 nays. The House also passed the legislation on the same
day but not until lengthy discussion of the employee protection provision
and the MAP linkage had transpired. Regarding employee protections, Rep.
Anderson pointed out that "This is the first time airline employees have
oeen given these benefits. Under existing law, employment can and does
fluctuate widely, and displaced employees are not given any protection by
law.... I believe that.... the conference provisions represent substantial
33progress for the airline employees." Mr. Mineta, the sponsor of the
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House employee protection provision, struct a different tone by
expressing grave concern about tne protection contained in tne Conference
Report. "By oomparison with the House-passed provision, the conference
agreement - which was based on the Senate language
- is not much
protection at all." 34 Although regretting the Conference compromise,
ns P • PJineta
,
along with 355 of
opposition amounting to 6 nays,
his signature.
his peers, voted for passage with token
Now the bill went to the President for
executive Intent Prior to Passage of tne Act
While momentum for airline deregulation slowly developed in the
Congress, President Carter reaffirmed his campaign promises of less
government interference in the American society and reductions in the
size of government in a speech at a White House press conference on 20
oune 1977 favoring deregulation of the domestic airline industry,
earlier in
-<-977, Secretary ot Transportation Brocx Adams also supported
deregulation in testimony beiore Senator Cannon's Commerce Committee.
Not only did the Department of Transportation (DOT) taxe this position
but tne CAB was now in a philosophical stance where it could also
strongly advocate greater airline management flexibility in decisions
regarding routes, fares and services. (Incidentally, the CAB never has
had the authority to dictate the frequency, schedules or the type of
aircraft to be used.) By increasing flexibility in these matters, a
phased deregulation of the industry could evolve to a point eventually
equivalent to otner traditionally unregulated industrial sectors. The
first indications of interest in the impact of deregulation on airline
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employees are contained in a heavily documented,




Labor - There is some evidence that deregulation willtena to keep wages from rising as fast as they would
otherwise, increase the number of jobs available in theindustry, and enhance productivity. The CAB staff has
estimated that regulation tends to raise airline wages
by artificially enhancing the power of airline unions,
thus implying that deregulation would tend to hold down
wages. Studies indicate, however that non-CAB carriers
and non-unionized CAB carriers pay comparable wages to
unionized CAB carriers at comparable seniority levels,
ihe number of jobs would seem likely to increase since
such increases have been observed in the area
stimulated by intrastate carriers. Like management,
however, labor would be dislocated by substantial
changes in the fortunes of a given airline. Since
airline employee practices are characterized by very
strong seniority benefits, it may be difficult for a
laid-off senior employee to find employment with
comparable benefits from another airline. Finally, it
appears that the non-CAB regulated carriers have
achieved substantially higher rates of productivity
than the CAB-regulated carriers and therefore that
deregulation might increase productivity . "35
This brief caption provides much of the basic logic for the
Administration's position. That position was explicitly enunciated by
Charles Schultze, Chairman of the president's Council of Economic
Advisers, on 22 March 1977 in testimony given before the Senate
Subcommittee on Aviation:
"What about labor? In his message to the
Congress, the President made it clear that the
administration recognizes an obligation to protect the
legitimate interests of airline employees.
What might these legitimate interests be?
In the administration's view, the Federal
Government would have a valid cause for concern only if
it could be demonstrated that the transitional effects
directly resulting from the enactment of airline
regulatory reform legislation are substantial, so
substantial that they cannot be handled by the normal
procedures now in effect in this industry.
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However, we are unwilling to support any proposal
that would provide workers with absolute protectionfrom the normal ups and downs of business activity
within a less regulated airline industry.
Such protection would be undeserved and would
grant airline worxers an unprecedented measure of
security
.
We urge tne committee to keep the following
principles in mind as it wrestles with this complex
problem.
_n contrast to the case of the railroads, firms
are actively seeking to enter the airline industry, and
firms in the industry are seeking to expand.
Consequently
,
the most plausible expectation is that
total industry employment opportunities will increase,
not decrease, as a result of regulatory reform.
oince tnere will be no wholesale abandonment or
disruption of service as a result of regulatory reform
and since any entry or exit provisions likely to be
embodied in legislation will be carefully phased, no
significant displacement of labor is likely even in the
short run.
Substantial shiits in employment currently occur
regularly within the airline industry. As business
expands, workers are hired. As it contracts, they are
laid off, sometimes on a rather large scale.
Quarter-to-quarter changes in carrier employment
of several percentage points are not uncommon.
Compensating worxers for all such shifts would be very
expensive and unjustified.
Consequently, to be acceptable, labor protection
provisions must be able to discriminate against this
normal labor turnover activity ana the rather small
direct impacts that may accompany regulatory reform.
In the event of a merger or major route swap, tne
CAB currently has procedures to see to it that no
worxer is disadvantaged. Current labor contracts
contain provisions providing furlough protection.
Nothing in the proposed legislation would affect either
of these.
In sum, based upon the available evidence to date,
the administration is not persuaded that airline
regulatory reform will harm the legitimate interests of
labor. However, if a case for protection can be made,
we are prepared to work together with the Congress in
determining what remedies might be appropriate.
These two positions indicate a confluence of opinions between
Department of Transportation and tne Executive Office of the President
the
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However, the specific recommendations of the DOT were most telling
and, as measured Oy the outcomes, most effective in steering the
Administration and in developing the Senate language.
"We recommend the Administration not support specificlabor protection provisions at this time. However, ifpressed, Administration witnesses should be willing to
assure Congress that the Administration will not oppose
^eas^nable and limited labor protection provisions
provided labor can show (a) that actions accompanying
the introduction of airline regulatory reform will be
sufficiently disruptive that special protection isjustified (the baseline against which this must be
shown is <,he rather substantial level of labor turnover
activity that is a current characteristic of thisindustry - see below); (b) that existing CAB procedures
and union contract provisions are inadequate to handle
any problem that might be found to exist; and (c) that
^aaor protection provisions can be designed tnat
provide aid only to workers whose situations are
significantly affected by regulatory reform. The
Administration should make it absolutely clear that it
will not accept provisions under the name of 'labor
protection' that guarantee every existing job; this
would put a straight jacket on labor mobility in this
industry." 3 ' (Emphasis is in the original.)
The DOT sought to insure early on that the potentially affected laoor
organizations did not garner support for an employee protection provision
similar to Title V of the Regional Rail Reorganizaton Act of 1973. As
discussed in Chapter I, this Title insured that adversely affected
employees would be guaranteed either a comparably paying job or a monthly
allowance equal to their recent average monthly earnings on the condition
that they move to wherever work was available. In a close reading of the
tone of the DOT support document, the author detects that DOT may be
speaking for airline management. If Title V-type provisions were passed
without basic modifications, tne carriers would be solely responsible for
providing earning protection for the affected employee until placed in a
job at his prior earning level.
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In the early summer of 1977, the White House Domestic Policy Staff
commenced the development of a formal Administration position on airline
employee protection provisions. Submission of various alternatives
regarding labor were collected from representatives of the pertinent
Departments, including DOL and DOT. The Department of Labor recommended
the prevailing Allegheny-Monawk level of protection, assigning the
Secretary of Labor responsibility for administering airline employee
protections, and an UMTA-style (Urban Mass Transportation Act)
certification of the adequacy and fairness of the prospective individual
protective arrangements. Prior to Senator Danforth’s initial
recommendation of laoor protections on 13 October 1977, the
Administration had internally indicated its disapproval of employee
projections unless they were applied to adversely affected employees who
had surrered dislocations directly attributable to tne implementation of
jhe deregulation legislation. On 20 October 1977, representatives of the
major air carrier employee organizations met with tne Secretary of Laoor
to voice their concerns and request his support for employee protections.
On 9 November 1977, legislation deregulating the air cargo industry
•was signed into law by the President without any employee protective
provisions. This omission probably created concern on tne part of both
the Assistant Secretary for Labor Management Relations, Francis X.
Burkhardt and LMSA constituents because, shortly thereafter, he
petitioned the Secretary of Labor, Ray Marshall, for active support of a
DOL policy on employee protections in general. and airlines in
particular. His reasons were apparently twofold: (1) to respond to the
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concerns of organised labor 33 and (2) to assume a leadersnip position
for his Agency (LMSA) on the entire issue of employee protections. Ass't
Secretary BurKhardt sought to nave employee protections at a level no
less than those provided by the industry included in the regulatory
reform of the airline industry. Further, he sought the Secretary's
support to reverse the Domestic Council's and Office of Management and
Budget's (OMB) opposition to the inclusion of an£ employee protections In
the airline legislation. He pointed out that other constituencies, such
as airline management, stockholders and small communities, had been
pursuing their concerns with their respective agencies and in Congress.
Their concerns appeared to be addressed in both versions of the pending
legislation through various guarantees and protections. Except for
ainine employees, all other interests involved appeared to be granted
some compensatory protections. In addition to this entreaty, Burkhardt
compared the inadequacy, in his opinion, of the legislatively-proposed
protective provisions, to the extensiveness of the airline unions'
positions and the reasonableness of LMSA's suggested provisions.
There were several activities that while not oeing specifically
related to the Airline Deregulation Act were relevant to the Department
or Labor's ongoing liaison with the industry. On November 23rd, LMSA met
with representatives of the Airline Industrial Relations Conference
(AirCon) in order to discuss their inputs on a wide range of
industry-related issues, including tne financial impact of deregulation.
In January of 1978, the Secretary convened the first DOL Airline
Conference wich senior level members of airline management and airline
employee organizations in order to facilitate labor peace in the
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industry. However, the purpose of this continuing Conference did not
include specific discussion of deregulation employee protections.
Meanwhile, throughout the spring of 1973, meetings on airline employee
protections continued between White House representatives and DOL.
-he President's position on airline employee protections became
unmistakable on 27 March 1973. During the signing ceremony of the
legislation authorizing the expansion of the Redwoods National Park -
which contained an all-encompassing and very generous employee protection
package that far exceeded the range of benefits even discussed for
airlines - President Carter specifically denounced employee protections
and expressed nis reservations in signing legislation containing such
protections.
In May, the Under Secretary of Laoor, Rooert Brown, representing the
views or a group oi senior-level DOL officials and representatives of
organized labor, concluded that workforce dislocations would continue to
occur and that the currently fragmented and uneven responses to them were
inadequate. Because of the lack of an initiative on the part of the
Administration on employee protections, Congress would, no doubt,
continue to fashion individual remedies in response to various political
pressures. Under Secretary Brown pointed out that the Administration
would do much better by accepting the inevitability of dislocations chat
develop as a result of public policy decisions and initiate a broad White
House-sponsored policy on employee protections.
Throughout the exchange of views with the Domestic Council and OMB up
until the joint House-Senate Conference, DOL was consistent in its view
that some form of employee protections would ultimately oe included.
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Therefore, in order to get an acceptable, reasonable and workable
provision, the Administration should guide Congress in tne development of
employee protections rather than opposing protections outright. As
passage oi a bill containing some form of employee protections became
imminently apparent
,
the Domestic Council began signaling marginal
receptivity for the structure of the Senate employee protections which
more nearly resembled the Administration’s minimum position than did the
House bill. Undoubtedly, this change in position occurred because of the
Administration’s experience with the Redwood bill where it took an
absolute position in opposition to employee protections and was presented
with a bill which contained such a vast array of benefits as to be deemed
onerous by the White House.
The passage of the Senate bill, S. 2493, catalyzed DOL and LMSA into
specifically-directed activity. The Labor Management Relations Service
(LMRS) is operationally responsible for tne administration of several
existing employee protection programs. LMRS had been closely monitoring
the progress of employee protection provisions through both Houses of
Congress, as well as providing technical assistance upon request by
Congress and with the approval of the White House Domestic Council. Tne
Secretary of Labor proposed contact with the Secretary of Transportation
Brock Adams for consultations in light of the lacx of a clear-cut
Administration policy. On 19 June 1973, Ass't Secretary Burkhardt
authorized LMRS and the Division of Employee Protections (DEP) to gather
a planning group in preparation for the passage of airline reform
legislation in order to prevent a repetition of the Redwoods experience.
The Redwoods bill had proved to be a considerable strain on the
Agency's personnel resources in that when such a bill is signed into law,
benefits and services are expected to be forthcoming immediately to the
individuals seeking remedy for tneir problems. The Redwoods Act proved
to be a complicated piece of employee protection legislation requiring
extensive interpretation and complex programmatical linkages. The Agency
was hard pressed to find enough people on short notice to establish the
program machinery and to develop program policies ana guidance in order
to award benefits to the eligible lumbermen and mill workers within six
months of passage. Fifteen months after passage of the Redwoods Act, tne
Agency had declared approximately 2000 individuals eligible and those
people were receiving monthly assistance payments; however, due to its
efforts in that direction, the Agency had yet to be able to publish its
regulations and to complete the arrangements for the pension, health and
welfare plans mandated by the law. It was felt that any repeat of this
performance would be embarrassing for the Agency and the Department.
Thus, a planning group for airline protections was developed and
constituted by 2 L\ July 1978 in anticipation of tne passage of the Act.
At the same time, the Department responded to a July request from the
rihite House Domestic Policy Staff for the DOL position on the pertinent
portions of the airline reform bills. The Department opted for a variety
of different features contained in one or the other prospective bills.
From the viewpoint of administrative feasibility and programmatical
consistency, the duration and basic level of benefits, and tne lump sum
option, DOL favored the House version. However, DOL did prefer certain
aspects of the Senate bill - the ten year limit on eligibility by
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claimants and preferential Wring rignts. The Department strongly
opposed the inclusion of a legislative veto of regulations such as that
contained in the Senate bill. This objection was consistent with the
President's position, as stated on June ,ja 21st m a speecn to Congress,
that he considered this kind of legislative review of the Airline
Employee Protection Program regulations to be an unconstitutional
infringement upon the powers of the Executive Office and that these kinds
of vetoes upset tne constitutional balance between tne separate branches
of government. The Department of Labor's response to the request for its
position went to Mary Scnuman, Assistant Director of tne White House
Domestic Policy Staff, on July 10th. It was followed in the middle of
September by a letter to Ms. Sohuraan from Frank Burkhardt advising her of
the creation of a DOL planning task force and providing her with two
lists (one for each bill under consideration) of questions of legislative
intent and technical implementation that had been developed by the
Departmental task force in consultation with LMSA and the Employment and
Training Administration (ETA).
In order to continue emphasizing deregulation, President Carter
announced a new international air route policy on August 21st. The new
policy stimulated competition among airlines and reduced fares for
passengers and air freight rates for snippers. "In announcing the new
policy President Carter described it (sic) a part of his continuing
el fort 'to introduce the airline industry to the benefits of competition
39both at home and aDroad.'" It was particularly criticized by labor,
but airline management and certain Members of Congress also felt that it
was unfavorable to tne U.S.
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In September, 1978, the President nominated Marvin Cohen to the CAB
Chairmanship to replace Alfred Kahn who had been elevated to the Council
of Economic Advisors (CEA, in the Executive Office of the President as
n„ad o, the council of Wage and Price Stability (CWPSi, as tne
President's chief inflation fighter. To Mr. Cohen now fell the tasx of
implementing the final deregulation bill, and as it turns out, the
dismantling of the CAB. The appointment of Mr. Cohen continued the
momentum of tne effort that was now rapidly approaching fruition, i.e.,
airline deregulation. Nothing more significant occurred regarding
employee protections except that during tne joint House-Senate
Conference, Mary Schuman signaled the Administration's tacit acceptance
of Senate-type protections at a reduced level. In essence, the
Conference left the determination of the level of benefits up to the
Secretary of Labor. This was probably done in order to avoid an outright
conflict between those who supported strong employee protections and the
President. On 24 October 1978, the Presicer.t signed the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 and, thus, the Act became law (Public Law
95-504)
.
Development of tne Program
The planning task force was designed with two levels. At the
Department level, the task force was made up of representatives from
LM3A, the Solicitor of Labor's Office, ETA, ASPER (Assistant Secretary
for Policy, Evaluation and Research) and OASAM (Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Administration and Management.) This group's
71
responsibilities were for policy review, technical assistance and
administrative coordination to insure that the Department complied with
ail easting laws and regulations in implementing the new law. The
second planning task force at LMSA included internal LMSA representatives
mom MRS (Laoor Management Relations Services), LMPD (Labor Management
Policy Development), 0AM (Office of Administration and Management), 0F0
(Office oi Field Operations), PWBP (Pension Welfare Benefits Program),
and OPSic (Office of Planning, Evaluation and Systems.) The primary
actors in this planning task force were Peter Husselmann from LMR3,
Sheldon K^ine trom LMPD and Walter Steiner from OPE&S. This group was
augmented as necessary by ETA (Robert Johnson) and by LMSA field
personnel (Thomas Stover and Hugh Segal) and a National Mediation Board
(NMB) mediator (Thomas Roadley) on temporary assignment. This was the
basic working group supplemented by attorneys from the Solicitor's
Of I ice. This working group was convened shortly after its appointment on
24 July 1973. A comparable group at ETA also was formed under the Deputy
Director, Office of Program Management, Robert Kenyon. Lary Yud, Chief
of the Division of Employee Protections in LMRS, presided over the LMSA
working group. The first task assigned these groups was to examine the
pieces of legislation (S. 2493 and the House bxlls) that were under
consideration and to frame policy and technical questions not adequately
addressed in tne legislation. These were the bases for the questions
sent to Ms. Schuman at the White House by the Department prior to the
joint House-Senate Conference.
Prior to passage of the Act there was no demarcation of
responsioilities between Agencies because the employee protection
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language had not been finalized. Given the differences in the
protections programs proposed under the House and Senate bills (the House
bill more nearly identifiable with LMSA and the Senate bill witn ETA),
uMSA and ETA pursued independent research and development of the issues.
Although Ass't Secretary 3urkhardt had attempted to establish LMSA's
primacy in the employee protections area, STA contended that it should
have the lead responsibility in the benefits area of tne legislation.
EiA's position was based on its experience with the Trade Adjustment
Assistance Act and, especially, the Redwoods National Park Expansion
Act. In the case of Redwoods, ETA was, in fact, operationally
subordinated to LMSA in that LMSA had the policy lead on virtually all of
tne salient issues, including the payment of benefits. This meant that
LMSA was deciding and directing the assignment of ETA resources and,
further, was involving itself with traditional ETA-SE3A (State Employment
Security Agency) relationships
. ETA was not about to allow that to occur
again with the Airline Program.
Although Secretary Marshall had given LMSA the lead responsibility
tor the Airlines Act initially in June, 1978, enactment clearly defined a
specific program and required a thoughtful re-examination of the
apportionment of responsibilities. On November 8th, shortly after
enactment, Mary Ann Wyrsch, Special Assistant to the Executive Assistant
to the Secretary, convened the principal parties and requested a series
of issue papers in order to develop a better understanding of the nature
of the policy issues involved. Eleven papers were developed and
forwarded as alert memoranda to the Secretary. They provided initial




the estal>Ushment of policy. In addition, the two Assistant
described the areas of agreement and disagreement between
them.
"LMSA should have the policy resolution and regulation
preparation under Section 43d. (Author's note: Section
43d concerns the first right of hire.) (Except thedetermination of an individual's obligation to maintain
eligibility for monthly and relocation allowances), and
operational responsibility for negotiating both the
seniority and rehire provisions of the Act.
Si A, through the State Employment Security Agencies,
should be responsible for administering (delivery) of
monthly benefit allowances, relocation allowances,
insuring that eligibility requirements are met, and
providing reemployment assistance.
Disagreement arises, however, as to who should oe
responsible for regulation development, policy
authority and resolution or appeals concerning monthly
oenefits, relocation allowances and reemployment
assistance . "^0
Tne Secretary concurred with Ms. Wyrsch's recommendation that "ETA should
be given final responsibility for the policy direction of the benefit
payment portion of the Airline Deregulation Act's employee protection
41
provisions." She pointed out LMSA's mention of ETA's opposition to
special employee protection programs, such as the Trade Act and
Redwoods. On the other hand, she noted ETA's concern of the special
employee protection programs operating througn ETA mechanisms (SESA's)
but ETA not saving policy responsibility for these programs.
As a result of that decision, the Secretary issued the Delegations of
Authority and the Assignments of Responsioility for the Airline
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Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) on 5 February 1979* LMSA was
delegated authority and assigned responsibility for (1) developing,
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promulgating and administering the policies, procedures and regulations
regarding the hiring and rehiring practices and the nationwide joo list;
(2) encour>aSing negotiations between air carriers and representatives of
afrectea employees concerning reniring practices and seniority issues;
and, (3) requesting the airlines to file the necessary information in
order to effectuate the job list. ETA drew the remaining
responsibilities, the most noteworthy of which was the policy
responsibility for individual eligibility and monthly benefits.
At about the same time as the responsibilities were being assigned,
President Carter sent Secretary Marshall a memorandum stating the
President's directions regarding the submission of regulations to
Congress for review and approval. "I have informed Congress... that I
would interpret all such legislative veto provisions to be 'report and
wait' provisions. I want this interpretation to apply to the provision
in ^ This meant that the regulations should be submitted to
Congress within the prescribed six months, but that any single vote of
disapproval by either House was insufficient to block the regulations
from going into effect. Only a new bill or a joint resolution subject to
Presidential review and signed oy the President could block the
regulations from publication. In fact, because of intensive 0M3
involvement on the policy aspects, e.g., benefit levels and the
associated costs, the final regulations were delayed going to Congress
beyond the April 24, 1979 deadline.
Since DOL now had an immediate responsibility for implementing
Section 43 of the ADA, events began to take shape. On January 24, the
Assistant Secretaries from LM3A and ETA jointly forwarded nine major
75
issues with alternatives and recommended strategies for implementation to
the Under Secretary for decisions. These nine topics were:
(1) A pay cap on monthly assistance payments was
inferred in the legislative history - Should there
even be a pay cap and, if so, at what amount?
(2) Congress left the determination of the percentage
Oi wages attributable to the monthly assistance
payment to the Secretary of Labor - Should it be
the Allegheny
-Mohawk labor protective provision
levei C 60% oi average monthly gross wages) or
higher ( 70 % of average monthly gross wages)?
(3) Should fringe benefits be compensated for?
(4) Are the terms "other employment" and "reasonably
comparable employment" synonymous?
(5) What amount of monthly assistance should be paid
to an eligible protected employee (that is a
protected employee who actually suffers a
qualifying dislocation) who refuses reasonably
comparable employment? What is reasonably
comparable employment?
(5) What amount or percentage of monthly assistance
should be deducted as an offset of earnings from
other than reasonably comparable employment?
(7) When does the period of eligibility commence for
monthly assistance payments? In other words,
should the U.S. Government pay an eligible
protected employee from the date that the airline
reaches the 7 1/2% trigger, or retroactively to
when the employee was laid off (which could be as
early as twelve months prior to the trigger date?)
(8) What tact should be taken regarding the
administration of the first right of hire where no
enforcement powers or sanctions are included in
the Act?
(9) Should DOL encourage negotiations between carriers
and unions on rehiring practices and seniority on
a broad industry basis or react to individual
labor disruptions by attempting to ameliorate the
situation by facilitating favoraole employment
conditions with other carriers? 4 ^
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These issues were considered individually by Under Secretary Brown.
Tentative decisions were verbally transmitted to tne responsible Agency
as they were decided. Certain decisions have not been finalized as of
this writing due to continued Executive-level discussions. While these
decisions were being made, DDL nevertheless had a clear-cut
responsibility to respond to any claims from affected airline employees
who had been iaid oit : rom the date of enactment (24 October 1973)
onward. The final procedures could only be instituted after publication
of the final regulations in the Federal Register following the
Congressional review period. In the meantime, it was necessary to
prepare interim measures to respond to inquiries and complaints.
At this point in the implementation of the program certain judgments
naa to be made in order to develop responsible interim measures that
would meet the needs of the clients but, at the same time, not waste
resources. As Senator McGovern had pointed out on the Senate floor, no
one had an accurate idea of the number of airline employees who might oe
adversely arfected as a result of deregulation . Nonetheless, it was
necessary for planning purposes to estimate the potential number of
complaints that could be anticipated.
This estimate was developed in the following manner: The total
airline industry employed 312,000 workers of all classes and crafts.
Statistically speaking, this was the universe from which cases i.e.,
complaints, would come. It appeared that the type of problem that would
require LMsA's immediate attention would revolve around furloughed
airline employees who attempted to exercise their first right of hire at
another airline. Tne law stipulated that only employees of certificated
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carriers who had four or more years of full-time service as of 24 October
1978 were eligible to exercise this right. Therefore, it was necessary
for LMSA to estimate this subgroup of the universe (of airline workers.)
After a quick sampling of industry sources in an effort to collect
aggregate information on the seniority characteristics of their labor
iorce anu their labor turnover, LMSA estimated the population of
protected employees at 240,000. It was projected that complaints, whion
were a result of airlines allegedly denying protected employees their
iirst right of hire, could range anywnere from 0 to 2,000. Although
diversified research was conducted, it was agreed than there were no
analogous experiences from which to derive data or assumptions since the
industry had always been tightly regulated and was now entering a
progressively more deregulated environment.
Thus, with that wide of a range of possiole complaints, the Agency
felt that it had to be prepared for some operational complaint case
influx. For budgetary justification of workload, it was conservatively
estimated that the program would receive 25 cases per year in Fiscal
fears 1930 and 1981. That may have been a low estimate given many
airlines' resistance to hiring competitors' former employees who would
keep their recall rights, as well as the questions surrounding such
situations as "termination for cause" and established company policies of
not hiring tneir own former terminated employees (not having recall
rights.) If the influx of cases was appreciably higher, the Agency would
have to request additional resources to handle the increase.
Accordingly, minimal measures for handling cases were developed and
established in the Agency. Shortly after enactment, a small number of
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layoffs occurred in Boston when National Airlines dropped its service,
and in Providence where both National and American Airlines discontinued
service. The individuals who were laid off were assisted on an ad hoc
ba-iiS °y tne Dlvision of Employee Protections in LMSA
. ETA was not in a
position to extend any special assistance beyond the available employment
services already in existence (testing, counseling, interviewing, job
r„f^. rai and job placemen^) and unemployment compensation. LMSA
attempted to assist these adversely affected employees by calling ana
writing on their behalf and pointing out the duty to hire to the airlines
that were continuing to operate in Boston and Providence and contacting
Piedmont Airlines, which was introducing new service to Boston. In the
absence or an established program, there was little beyond tne existing
SESA services tha^ could be done to assist these employees. These
individuaxs could not be considered cases because program eligibility
crioer^a had not been finally established nor had there been an
allegation that the first rignt of hire nad been violated.
In January, 1979, one of the members of the LMSA working group
developed an options paper regarding the implications and other aspects
of case handling for LMSA. In the paper, he alluded to the potential for
an initial complaint case filing of unknown proportion, as well as a
continuing case filing of unknown dimension for up to sixteen years
beyond enactment. Given the uncertainties, he went on to describe some
of the requirements in the light of his interpretation of the law.
"Nevertheless
,
LMSA should be prepared for some amount
of caseworx. Although it may initially be a very small
number of cases, it contains a potential for rapid
expansion. LMSA has a responsibility to process an
employee's claim that his first right of hire has been
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violated. Beoauae the legislation does not provide for






'S leas t > it appears clear tnat LMSAshould. develop procedures to collect information on the
establish
the parties unearned, investigate and
,
n facts, judge merit and provide good offices
and mediation services in an effort to resolve thecomplaint in an amicable and equitable fashion.
As the regulatory process now stands, any protected
employee or eligible protected employee who believestnat his right of hire has been violated must resort toprivate action in the courts for redress if LMSA is
d?spi?e.^5
enC°UraSe 3 VOlunta^ settlement of the
Several options were posed and the one that was recommended suggested
-hat the LMSA intensively train a representative from each of its six
Regional Offices in all aspects of tne Airline Employee Protection
Program to process cases. If case influx overwhelmed these individuals,
then tne Agency should train several hundred LMSA Investigators
,
who
routinely carry out LMSA's other mandated responsibilities, to nandle
Airline cases and request additional personnel from Congress to maxe up
the shortfall in staffing resources. This seemed to be tne most
reasonable and flexible measured response to the ambiguities surrounding
complaints
.
Shortly thereafter on March 2nd, the Assistant Secretary sent a
Motice to LMSA field personnel informing them of the law, LMSA's
responsibilities and what they should do if contacted by former airline
employees with complaints. The field personnel were directed to forward
these individuals' names and addresses to tne National Office by
telephone and, also, to inform their respective Regional representative.
Until publication of tne final regulations governing the program, this
has been the modus operandi for the Agency.
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An Airline Deregulation Act Regulations Development Plan was
forwarded to Under Secretary Brown oy Assistant Secretaries Burkhardt and
Green ( LMSA and ETA, respectively) on 3 January 1979. A plan was
necessitated Py Executive Order 12049 (Improving Government Regulations)
and Deoartmental policies. In this Plan, the utilization of public
comment was described. "Any new issues
,
fresh alternatives or
unanticipated responses would be analyzed for feasibility and
responsibility. If found to be in the public interest and in harmony
with policy objectives, these new concepts would be included in tne
46proposed regulation,..." Also, since tne Act required that
regulations be promulgated within six months after enactment, a plan was
necessary to accomplish this task in a timely manner.
The proposed regulations were officially published in tne Federal
Register on 30 March 1979 • Tney were the joint product of LMSA and ETA.
They were a tentative formalization of the decisions reached by the
Secretary of Laoor, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation
(as required by the Act,) and 0MB. A provisional timetable for
promulgation of the rules and regulations had been drafted prior to
enactment. However, the need to adequately canvas public comment and the
continuing debate between the DOL and 0M3 regarding such things as
benefit levels and pay caps combined with a lacx of program personnel
slowed down the process considerably
.
The proposed regulations were a product of input from various
segments of the airline industry and the general public. First, LMSA and
ETA separately sketched out the regulations that governed the
responsibilities that they had been delegated by tne Secretary of Labor.
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Second, multiple collaborative inter-Agency meetings ensued to adjust,
line tune and meld the two proposed operations together where required.
Tnen LMSA invited representatives of airline management and airline
unions to two separate briefings given under the auspices of LMRS (Labor
Management Relations Services. ) The union representatives met on January
8th and the management representatives on January 10th at the National
Office of the Department of Labor in Washington, D.C. The agenda were
identical i or both groups and generally described the roles of the two
Agencies and a timetable for publishing the regulations. The first right
of hire and, conversely, the duty to hire, the national center for the
National Listing of Air Carrier Jobs and its operation, the proposed
Labor
-Management Co inmittee and its purpose and role, and interim
procedures were all discussed. Inputs from the attendees were sought and
notes were made on salient issues. Union representatives questioned the
Department’s position that in the absence of clear language no
enforcement powers could be asserted under Section 43«
The management representatives took vociferous exception to DOL's
interpretation of tne term "protected employee" in that DOL was according
tne first right of hire - illegally as they saw it - to any employee wno
had four years of full-time service with a certificated carrier without a
qualifying dislocation and a CAB determination. The carriers felt that
only eligiole protected employees, i.e., only those wno were adversely
impacted by a "qualifying dislocation" - a major contraction or
bankruptcy - as determined by the CAB, should be accorded the first right
of .oire . After some emotional debate nad transpired, Charles Wood, a
legislative aide to Senator Danforch (the originator of the Senate
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employee protections section and a member of the Conference Committee)
announced that, yes, in fact, the Department of Labor was correctly
interpreting the legislative intent as the product of the joint
House-Senate Conference. While that comment and the subsequent
explanation by Mr. Wood quieted the discussion for the moment, the
airlines maintained tneir objection to that interpretation.
Subsequently, they have sought elaboration from the Congress to support
their x n oer pretat ion . They allege that it makes the Federal Government a
hiring hall and that it is "reregulation" rather "deregulation."^ So
far, they have had no effect in Congress on this issue. The attendees to
the two meetings were invited to submit further comments in writing along
with their nominations for the Labor-Management Committee.
Because the law grants and provides the first right of hire to job
vacancies at other carriers while preserving seniority and recall rights
with the employee's original carrier, the Act designated the Secretary to
"...encourage negotiations between air carriers and representatives of
eligible protected employees with respect to rehiring practices and
43
seniority." The Labor-Management Committee is the Secretary's
approach to satisfying this requirement in Section 43 (d) ( 3 ) of the
Act. As contained in tne Charter of the Committee, and as required under
the Advisory Committee Act, the purpose is to advise the Assistant
Secretary for Labor Management Relations on these issues. Tne purpose of
the Committee is to serve as a working advisory group to assist the
Department in its efforts to promote negotiations which will produce a
voluntary private agreement or other mechanisms to facilitate those
aspects of employee protection objectives of the ADA.
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Ton fioadley, an experienced mediator from the National Mediation
Board ana Known to most airline labor and management representatives, was
detailed to LMSA to assist in developing the Committee, and since that
time has accepted a position with the Division of Employee Protections
for that continuing purpose. The Committee itself is composed of nine
members of union and management each for a total of eighteen
participants. The nine management members represent United Airlines,
USAir, Seaboard World Airlines, Eastern Airlines, American Airlines,
Republic Airlines, TransAmerica Airlines, Continental Airlines and Pan
American World Airways. The nine representatives of employees are from
the Airline and Aerospace Employees - Teamsters Local 732, Air Line
Employees Association, Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks,
Transport Workers Union, Air Line Pilots Association, Association of
Plight Attendants, International Association of Machinists ana Aerospace
Workers, Independent Federation of Flight Attendants and the Flight
Engineers' International Association.
The first meeting of the Airline Deregulation Labor Management
Advisory Committee (its formal title) occurred on 20 March I960 in the
Secretary of Labor's offices in Washington, D.C. and was open to the
public. Ray Marshall, the Secretary of Labor, served as Chairman and
William P. Hobgood, the current Assistant Secretary for Laoor Management
Relations who succeeded Frank Burkhardt, served as the Committee
Chairperson. Opening remarks stressed the opportunity for the Committee
to exercise a positive influence on developing mechanisms to accommodate
the rehiring and seniority provision mandated in the Act. Mr. Hobgood
requested that all of the participants forward a list of topics, problems
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and issues suitable for the Committee's consideration. Statements of
support for any forthcoming negotiated processes that emanated from the
Committee's deliberations were unanimously proclaimed. Considerable
discussion ensued on various objections that concerned eitner labor or
management representatives. Mr. Hobgood kept the discussion witnin the
scope of the Charter of the Committee and explained that the list of
issues received would be developed into the agenda for the next meeting
to be held approximately two months hence. Thus, the only positive
outcome to really surface was the commitment on the part of the
participants to effect any agreement reached by the Committee's members
and to get unrepresented airlines ana unions to join in or, at least, to
acquiesce to whatever procedures or mechanisms could be developed.
Following LMSA's two public meetings with the airlines and the unions
in January, 1979 > ETA conducted a similar meeting on 2 February 1979 with
both union and management at the same time. It, too, proved to be a
stormy session. The unions strongly objected to the proposed payment
level which, at that time, was proposed as 7 5 % of an individual's
adjusted gross wage; on tne other hand, the airlines oojeoted to having
to file tneir job openings with the Employment Service and Keeping them
unfilled while the positions were listed.
The comments encountered during these sessions were collected,
discussed and judged for merit. Those deemed reasonable and in accord
with the intent of Congress were written into a revised draft of the
regulations. This is basically the same draft mentioned above that was
published in the Federal Register on 30 March 1979* A puDlic comment
8 o
period was stipulated from 3 0 March to 30 April 1979 . Courtesy copies
were forwarded to the attendees and other interested parties.
In an effort to gain insight into air carrier personnel practices and
the potential impact of the proposals being considered, a representative
from ETA (Robert Johnson) and several staffers from LMSA (Sheldon Kline,
Peter Husselmann and Walter Steiner) met with the various airline
representatives in charge of labor relations, employee policies,
personnel and other similar functions. Although not all airlines were
visited, approximately ten air carriers ranging in size of the numbers of
employees from the largest trunkline, United Airlines with 48,262
employees, to one of the smaller supplemental, world Airways with 858
employees, were given the opportunity to discuss their individual
problems and concerns. Carriers possessing relatively unique
characteristics, such as Delta Airlines which is largely non-unionized
except for its pilots, and Flying Tiger, an all-cargo carrier that was
deregUj.ateu oy Pubxic Law 95-16 3 in November, 1977) were also visited.
The exchange of views in this setting was fruitful and went some distance
in enhancing positive relationsnips. The frank discussion of positions
and policies ameliorated any antipathies that may have developed. Beyond
that, the concise outlining of intents and purposes clarified many
ambiguous areas. The DOL representatives urged the company
representatives to forward their written comments for active
consideration and to personally contact the Airline Employee Protection
Program (AEPP) staff with any questions.
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Approximately fifty comments were received from all sources by the
end of the public comment period. Comments covered the entire spectrum
of positions from those who wished to see the benefit level substantially
increased to those who saw the AEPP as a big government giveaway. Nearly
hall ox the comments emanated from State Employment Security Agencies who
saw innumerable difficulties in administering the Program. It should be
pointed out that their contentions were, for the most part,, technical
and minor m scope; however, ETA fully considered them. Many comments
were received from the air carriers and these generally reflected the
position of the Air Transport Association of America (ATA). The ATA felt
that only the eligible protected employees should have the first right of
hire; having to file job openings with the Employment Service was
unwarranted interference in the personnel practices of private firms; air
carriers' "terminations for cause" should go unchallenged; and, strikers
and workers laid off or terminated due to strikes, and part-time and
seasonal employees, should be excluded from coverage under the "protected
employee" label. The Airline Coordinating Committee, AFL-CIO and unions
such as the Air Line Pilots Association, Allied Pilots Association,
Association of Flight Attendants and the United Plant Guard Workers felt
that: (1) the benefit level and pay cap were too low; and (2) the
monthly assistance relocation payments were meant as reimbursement rather
than as unemployment insurance (which is the way that the AFL-CIO
contended that DOL (ETA) seemed to be interpreting Section 43.) The
responding unions argued that DOL should make the affected employees
nearly "whole" as if it were reimDursement for a loss. All of the
comments were entered in the official record and, on the basis o; these
comments, many alterations were made to the regulations.
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In addition to carrying out the first right of hire provision and
encouraging negotiations on rehiring practices and seniority, the
Secretary of Labor had delegated one other responsibility to LM3A - that
being to establish policy and provide guidance for the creation,
publication and distribution of a, comprehensive job list for protected
employees (Section 43 (d) (2)). However
,
ETA had been delegated the
responsibility for the actual management and operation of the national
center for Lne National Listing of the Airline Employee Job Vacancies.
The scope of the operation and services that could be provided were
considerably reduced when ETA learned that it would have to finance the
National Listing from its general operating fund, because no
appropriations designated for that purpose have been forthcoming from
Congress
.
ETA selected the South Carolina SESA as the national center. On 10
April 1979, Robert Johnson from ETA and Walter Steiner from LMSA traveled
to Columbia, S.C. to establish the machinery for the initiation and
production of the National Listing. Through discussions regarding
objectives and capaoilities, they, in concert with the automated services
professionals from tne SESA, developed a computer-produced micro-fiche
job listing that can be distributed to virtually every one of 2,800 local
Job Service offices nationwide on a bi-weekly basis. New job openings
among the air carriers are required to be filed as they occur witn local
job Service offices who subsequently transfer that job opening to the
national center for inclusion on the National Listing. In addition, all
activities on that job order, e.g., who was referred for interviews, who
was hired, etc. are also communicated to the center where tne
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information is stored and records are constantly updated. This will
allow for LMSA Investigators to query the system in pursuit of an alleged
violation of the first right of hire. (Author's note: As long as an air
carrier fills a job with a protected employee, it has fulfilled its duty
to hire.) The ability to accumulate several case histories on carrier's
job orders provides a method of monitoring which will be capable of
pointing out patterns of abuse on the part of individuals or the airlines.
Protected employees have sole access with priority referral to the
listing of airline joo vacancies for two weeks after publication. Then,
trie unfilled jobs are made availaole to the general public as well
(unless an airline has previously indicated that it does not want its
joos made available to the public-at-large). This issue of having to
hire protected employees and having to keep the vacancies open for a
speciried period or time (one week) has stimulated more criticism from
the airlines than any other single issue. Nevertheless
,
the job list is
specifically dictated in the act and it has been strictly interpreted by
the DOL, thereby excluding such options as a complementing employee list
or matching services.
Tne other major issue that has fomented much contention revolves
around tne benefit level for the eligible protected employees. Although
the draft of tne final regulations has been circulated for review for
some time now, that issue was hotly contested within tne Administration.
While LMSA drafted the original issue paper on benefit levels based on
the Senate bill prior to enactment, after enactment the responsibility
for establishing that level was delegated to ETA, and LMSA subsequently
withdrew from actively attempting to influence it. Notwithstanding, DOL
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was directed to propose the amount of a monthly assistance payment to be
70 percent of an eligible protected employee’s average monthly wage after
taxes with a maximum payment of $1,200 per month. This position was
somewhat embarrassing when the Department of Transportation (presumably
management-oriented) indicated that the amounts proposed by the
Department of Labor (presumably labor-oriented) were too low. Although
DOL appealed to 0MB for an upward revision, 0MB held firm.
One major au aeration that LMSA suggested which has been included in
ETA's regulations was the concept of a job search allowance rather than a
training allowance, as ETA had originally proposed. Since the field of
employment in aviation is predicted to expand, it makes much more sense
to relocate previously trained individuals and keep them in the industry,
rather than train them for new jobs outside of the industry.
Although Congress left the determination of benefit levels up to the
Secretary of Labor, fringe benefits had been dropped from the Senate bill
by an amendment proposed by Senator Cannon (D-Nevada) upon original
passage by the Senate. It was clear to DOL chat Congress did not want to
get into the business of guaranteeing fringe benefits that nad proven so
costly and administratively complex in implementing the Redwoods bill.
As a result, laid-off airline employees must make their own contributions
to any heaitn, welfare or pension plans to which they subscribe.
LMSA is currently developing a contingency strategy for utilization
of LMSA's field professionals in case of a major upsurge in case
activity. This could occur from a single incident such as the planned
move of American Airlines headquarters from New fork City to DaLlas,
Texas. Several hundred protected employees mignt be immediately eligible
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to exercise their first right of hire. At present, any cases alleging
violation of tne first right of hire are being handled at the LMSA
Regional and National Offices.
Tne proposed regulations have been suomitted to the cognizant
Committees m Congress and returned. However, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) contested the concept of the right of first
hire without definitive regulations regarding mandatory and voluntary
affirmative action plans, and how the right of first hire would operate
in that context. At this time, LMSA and EEOC are working to come to an
agreement on this issue.
Tnis concludes
-he chronicle of events that have transpired in the
translation of Senator Danfortn’s idea for employee protections to the
point where it has evolved into program machinery. A1 chough the program
establisnment nas not been finalized in all aspects, those issues of
significant relativity to LMSA appear to oe immutable at this time.
Now, in the next chapter, these experiences will be analyzed and
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CHAPTER III
THE INTEGRAL PROBLEMS
Any useful examination of the problems encountered during the
implementation state of the Airline Employee Protection Program
necessarily demands a perspective from which to analyze the efficacy of
the steps taken during the development of the program. These problems
represent an extensive range of highly particular and unique quandaries
that, upon preliminary review, seem to deny any logical attempt at
consistent analysis. However, after some assessment, it appears useful
to analyze these problems in the context of their outcomes, or failing
that, their anticipated outcomes.
This is not an attempt to establish a model for analyzing
implementation: That would require an explanation of all of the
variables involved which would prove unfeasible in this case because of
their infinite number.
"Implementation is too complicated and too little is
known about it to expect either orderliness or rigor when
analysis and assessment are actually undertaken. Indeed,
the study of implementation carries us into social
science's weakest area - dynamics. The determination of
whether or not a social program or policy can be
implemented cannot be based on a static checklist.
Rather, it must involve an analysis of whether technical,
bureaucratic, staff, and institutional/political elements
can be blended into a viable process. Implementation
analysis must ask whether the organization can do what is
desired in technical terms, whether it can function well
in a bureaucratic sense (which involves
micro-organizational issues), and whether it can operate
successfully in its larger environment (major
organizational /political issues). Questions of this type
push into relatively uncharted research terrain ." 1
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.his chapter is an attempt to utilize an analytical framework to
retrospectively examine the independent variables that will determine the
success of tne program, i.e., the outcomes. These independent variables
are not intended to be all-inclusive; instead, this framework will
provide a vantage point for only those major independent variaoles judged
oo oe critical to the success of the program. These major independent
variables are: the benefit levels ; the application of the first right of
i and, the utility of the labor-management committee
. Tne effects of
these separate measures will determine the outcome, i.e., the success, of
the program. On the oasis oi other efforts (Bardach, Pressman and
Wildavsky) to analyze the implementation process, the success or lack of
success of tne program can be judged in terms of how these effects impact
the program's intended beneficiaries - adversely affected airline workers.
The Case Study Demonstration
As we analyze the entire evolution of the law and the program is
analyzed, it appears that some of the specific objectives of the Airline
Employee Protection Program (ASPP) mandated in the legislation were
purposely left vague, were deferred, were logically unsound or were
politically unreasonaole. The author is reminded of Herbert Simon's
comment mentioned earlier in this paper^ wnere he alluded to the
consideration that legislators may desire to avoid unsavory political
choices that will place them in a defensive or unfavorable position at
election time. By not providing explicit guidance to the Executive




e.g., roll call votes on controversial and
potentially unpopular provisions. However, by averting decisions ac this
point, the conflict surrounding the alternative choices may be
transmitted forward into the implementation phase and create unnecessary
tension, acrimony and confusion during the organic formation of the
program. Often, this lack of precise direction eventually carries
through the Executive Branch's implementation and operational phases to
the courts wnere one party or another contests the Executive Branch's
interpretation of a provision in the legislation. This ambiguity seems
t0 06 * ne problera surrounding the airline benefit levels and paycap, as
well as the issue of the first right of hire, as developed in the
proposed regulations of the Airline Employee Protection Program.
Because of tne ill-defined language and obvious intent to defer the
decisions regarding these issues to the Secretary of Labor, the same
conflicting interest groups that were active in the legislative phase
were attempting to continue to exercise their influence during the
implementation phase. In addition, the Administration's initial
opposition to employee protections put Congress in tne defensive position
where it could not specifically declare nigh benefit levels (absent a
paycap) without running the risk of incurring a Presidential veto, as
weil as immediately precipitating a stiffening of resistance from
Congressmen wno were philosophically adverse to employee protections.
It, on the other hand, Congress nad specifically defined a stingy pay
level with a low paycap, in all probability, labor organizations would




it should be pointed out that the labor movement was on
the defensive when this legislation was developed. 3 it had suffered
several highly publicized legislative defeats during the 95th Congress,
including the much-touted common situs picketing bill for the
construction industry, and the effective neutralization of the
Kumphrey-Hawkins full employment bill. Another factor that mitigated the
effectiveness of the union movement to bring pressure to bear on the
Administration to enhance the employee protection program was the
apparent rift between the Administration and the top union leadership.
This was brought to a head when virtually the entire AFL-CIO contingent
walked out of the President's Advisory Committee on fighting inflation,
rrom this backdrop of events there developed what must be considered a
relatively modest employes protection program for airline employees
compared to prior protection programs in other industries.
Although Secretary Marshall and, in particular, Assistant Secretary
Burkhardt, championed a program of protections more advantageous to
adversely affected airline workers, the program as outlined in the
legislation meets the relatively austere outline originally suggested by
the Department of Transportation as a fallback position should the
Administration be required to accept employee protections. These
suggestions had been expressed to the Congress throughout the development
or the Airline Deregulation Act. The protections ultimately incorporated
into what became Section 43 during the joint House-Senate Conference




the comprehensive social issue regarding the propriety and
justice of industry-specific employee protections has not been settled.
This lack of national consensus on the direction that labor protections
should take continues to be riven with point and counterpoint, as
reflected in Congressional debate on airline employee protections and as
frequently discussed by policy makers in the labor field.
"Often, of course, it is difficult
- as in the
case of the expansion of tne Redwood National Park - toquantify the gains to the public welfare and to compare
-nem again with the benefits paid out to a specificgroup of workers. This means that in most instances -
in the absence of generally accepted standards of what
is 'fair' in the society - the ultimate justification
i or a program, and for the redistrioutive function it
represents, is a political one.
Political decisions or not, certain economic
questions concerning both equity and efficiency must be
addressed. On the equity side, every attempt must be
made to treat people in similar economic situations in
equal fashion. This is one of the arguments used by
those who favor the exclusive use of unemployment
insurance for all types of unemployment. If there are
to be special assistance programs for certain classes
Oi workers
,
tnen an attempt should be made to assure
that horizontal equity across programs and within each
program exists.
Economic efficiency demands that benefit levels
and duration of oenefits should oe structured to
encourage workers to seek new jobs. Or, under certain
circumstances, lump-sum payments to discharged worxers
would spur earlier job search than would weekly
benefits.
Care must be exercised in designing economically
efficient programs. Job protection programs in
inefficient industries promote less efficient
utilization of labor and result in a misallocation of
labor resources. . .
^
William K. Ris, Jr., in his perceptive article, "Government Protection of
Transportation Employees: Sound Policy or Costly Precedent?'', points out
tnat labor protections have historically resulted from short-term
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considerations that have not lent themselves to a studied analysis of the
social, economic and political ramifications. 5
It would appear that the Redwood law and the aoundant criticism of
both its eligibility criteria
- the "conclusive presumption" (virtually
all workers associated with the redwood industry in the two affected
northern California counties were eligible for benefits if they were laid
° ft durxn
*s ^ ae "window period")
- and its extremely generous benefits -
t.nat is, the potential for receiving up to fifty percent of former
-edwood wages while earning and keeping one hundred percent of current
wages m another industry, or receiving one hundred percent of former
redwood income wnile laid off - have highlighted and brought the issue of
employee protections to public attention. In the face of this,
sometimes, acrimonious criticism, decision-makers seem to be providing
more critical review of employee protective provisions. Two recent
examples ox this exceptive review concern Conrail and the Rock Island
Railroad
.
Congress appropriated a $250 million fund to support employee
projections included in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 that
created Conrail. That fund was supposed to last forty years until the
last eligible employee reached the retirement age of 65- However, due to
unconsidered factors, that fund was depleted oy tne end of 1979 and
"could cost from $884 million to $1.7 billion," 0 if not altered.
Although on 28 June 1980 tne Senate passed S.2530 authorizing an
additional $235 million for employee protection payments,' the Senate
made it clear that this would be the last authorization of funds for the
life of the Conrail employee protections program. S.2530 also revised
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the formulas for calculating monthly benefits and made other changes in
procedures. That bill has since become law with the Senate employee
protections intact.
The second example of exceptive review involves the U.S. Supreme
Court upholding a lower court injunction against using a portion of the
Rock Island Railroad's estate expressly for employee protections as
required by Public Law 96-254 providing for the liquidation of tne
railroad. The Railway Labor Executives’ Association (RLEA), representing
twenty labor organisations, has twice petitioned the Supreme Court for a
reversal of its decision. The Court upheld its first finding in response
to the RLEA's first petition. The second petition for a nearing remains
~n abeyance. Between 5,000 and 5,700 lormer railroad workers qualify for
those job protection payments. Perforce, the involved unions are
requesting that Congress issue some statement of intent to the effect
!,that the laid-off Rock Island workers be given job protections
9benefits." As yet, tnis has not occurred. In this case the Supreme
Court has only judged on the constitutionality of the legislative remedy
tabricated oy Congress. It has not passed judgment on the
constitutionality of employee protections. The intent of this example is
to demonstrate the exercise of critical review by Congress in that the
RLEA has requested Congress to make a statement in support of the remedy
but Congress has not reiterated its initial intentions by issuing any
such statement of support.
Perhaps this increased resistance to employee protections will only
occur in highly regulated industries, such as railroads, airlines,
trucking and communications. It is conceivable that this apparent
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increase in scrutiny is a result of a perception held by some that
workers m highly regulated business sectors enjoy pay and benefits that
far exceed what would normally be expected if these industries were less
regulated or unregulated. William Jordan, an economist, stated before
Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee that in the airline industry, labor was
able to profit because of the artifical insulation of status quo-oriented
economic regulation. This was due to:
"(1) Knowing tnat entry by new carriers with lower
laoor costs is unlikely
,
the unions have been able to
demand and obtain, over time, higher wages and more
costly work rules.
(2) The unions know that their employers are able
to transfer a large portion of the aoove-market wage
demands to the consumer through higher fares without
fear of price undercutting by other carriers.
( 3 ) If tneir company should fail as a result of
the high expense of labor, the employee can be fairly
certain that the company will be merged with or
acquired by another carrier desiring to obtain the
route authority of the failing company and in such
circumstances, the acquiring company will be required
to provide employment or substantial termination
payments to the affected employees." 10
This perception might explain the tremendous variance in tne level of
benefits bestowed on the clearly shrinking redwood industry and tne
supposedly healtny and expanding airline industry. Furthermore, tne Ris
article concluded that, "(i)n contrast to the railroad experience, the
airline labor protections are unlikely to be so great as to perpetuate
the existing inefficiencies in the industry. While they provide some
insulation for laoor in the transition to a deregulated environment,
virtually every other provision of the legislation will moderate labor's
traditional bargaining position." 11 In summary, Ris makes a point that
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while it may have been politically expedient to provide "backstop"
employee protections to the airline industry, it also set a precedent
that may often be repeated of the government providing special
transitional protections for workers who are adversely affected for
whatever reasons (deregulation, environmental violations, policy changes,
etc.) and without consideration for the viability and economic well-being
, 12
oi the industry in general.
Beyond all of the rationalization and rhetoric in support of or
against employee protections, its ultimate success or failure as a social
and governmental policy will hinge in large measure on the fullness of
the coffers. While the economy is healthy and the Nation can effort to
recognize tne special problems of people, beneficent industry-specific
employee protection programs will continue to be legislated. However,
when the Nation is on hard times and everyone is suffering some
deprivation, it will be very difficult for workers who feel chat their
employment problems are so unique that tney deserve special remedy to be
heard. This concludes the discussion of employee protections from a
social policy viewpoint.
The Application of Adminiscrative Theory
Now we shall attempt to analyze the implementation of Section 43 of
the Airline Deregulation Act - the Airline Employee Protection Program -
in some detail. The integral problems in implementing the airline
employee protections provision fall into five categories:
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(1) Inter-organizational problems, i.e., the Civil
Aeronautics Board 7 1/2% trigger mechanism, and
the requirement for consultations between the
Departments of Labor and Transportation.
v.2, 1 Problems surrounding the achievement of a
consensus on issues from interest groups.
^
'
Sot jc vUral-f unctional problems in developing tne
regulations and constituting the AEPP.
(4) Inherent political conflicts within the
Administration.
o) Intramural difficulties at the Department of Labor.
Eacn of these problem areas affected, individually or collectively, the
three independent variables (identified earlier) that will determine tne
success of the Airline Employee Protection Program.
The inter-organizational problems discussed here are really
hierarchical structural problems that inherently exist between agencies
and departments. While this category of problem is not definitively
exclusive from some of the other xinds of problems outlined above, it
represents a primary systemic problem affecting implementation on a
macro-governmental scale.
The law stipulated char, for monetary benefits under che program, tne
*
Civil Aeronautics Board maxs the determination of when an air carrier has
reduced its workforce, or appears tnat it will reduce its workforce in a
twelve month period, by at least 7 i/2% as a result of the air regulatory
reform effort. Because tne Secretary of Laoor would be responsible for
paying benefits to eligible protected employees so determined to be
adversely affected by the air deregulation legislation, the lack of a CAB
policy or the development of procedures on this topic proved to be a
difficult unknown to factor into tne implementation scheme.
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Considerable ambiguity surrounded the issues of the definition of
eligible Protected employees, the retroactivity of benefits once tne
trigger nad seen actuated, and the applicaoility of the eligibility
determination to certain of an air carrier's designated routes or regions
versus an air carrier's complete workforce. This ambiguity put the Labor
Department in a position of trying to design an adequate system for tne
payment of benefits without knowing the dimensions or the parameters of
the possible group of beneficiaries, the timing of any determinations, or
even it there would be any processes established to make determinations.
However, that was not the only inter-organizational problem.
The Act also mandated that the Secretary of Labor consult with the
Secretary of Transportation prior co the promulgation of guidelines for
oenetit levels. While it is acknowledged that the term "consult" does
not connote approval, nonetheless, tnere exists an implied responsioility
to seek agreement on an issue such as this. This situation became more
complicated when the Office of Management and 3udget became deeply
involved in the question of benefit levels and paycaps due to its
interest in minimizing the financial impact of the legislation.
Extensive resources were expended, and continue to be expended, on
the next category of problems. These problems revolved around attempts
to gain a consensus on outstanding issues contained in the proposed
regulations and elsewhere. For the most part, the Secretary of Labor's
policy decisions were contained in the proposed regulations. Operational
and administrative procedures as developed by the staff were made known
through a variety of mechanisms. In the interest of open government and
consistent with law and regulation, the Department of Labor sougnt the
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greatest exposure and circulation of its contemplated positions.
Additionally
,
it invited the views of all interested parties for advance
consideration in the decision-making process. As described earlier, the
DOL held open meetings to inform the puolic on its first draft of the
proposed regulations and procedures. Subsequently, the proposed
regulations were reviewed and revised where possible in accordance with
the comments submitted during and after the meetings. These proposed
regulations were then published in the Federal Register with the required
thirty day period for public comment following the publication date.
Concurrently
,
the regulations were submitted to the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on
Public Works and Transportation of the House of Representatives for
preliminary review. Approximately fifty responses were received from the
interested parties. In addition, DOL staff met with many air carriers in
order to gain a better understanding of the day-to-day impact on this
group as they would be the most heavily affected in terms of the
commitment of resources and effort to accommodate the DOL regulations
and procedures. All of tnese actions were designed to inform all
interested parties of all important activities and preliminary decisions
in order to allow for maximum public input in the regulations process.
Additionally, to provide a forum for negotiations between the air
carriers and the unions on rehiring and seniority (per Section 43(d) of
the Act), the Secretary of Labor established a labor-management advisory
committee. These types of committees had proven useful in other
industrial sectors, particularly in the construction industry,





The labor-management committee was designed to serve as
a continuing source of advice and input into the airline program's
developmental process (within the scope of its Charter.
)
Another category of problems that were both structural and functional
in nature, concerned the promulgation of the regulations and the
constitution of the program mechanisms. The proposed regulations
corresponded to policy decisions made by DOL's executive leadership after
public comment. In terms of structuring the program to fulfill these
policy goals, the inadequacy of the legislation in two specific areas
proved difficult to overcome.
The first area was financing. While paragraph (g) of Section 43
stated, "(t)here are authorized to be appropriated to such account
annually, beginning with the fiscal year ending Septemoer 30, 1979, such
sums as are necessary to carry out the purposes of this section,
including amounts necessary for the administrative expenses of the
Secretary related to carrying out the provisions of this section,
that phrase is simply a statement of Congress authorizing itself to
appropriate funds, not the actual appropriation of funds to carry out the
program. No appropriation bill has ever oeen passed to fund this
program. Unless large-scale layoffs or air carrier bankruptcies are
experienced, it is highly unlikely that any funds will oe appropriated
for this purpose. In the meantime, the Department must still comply with
the Act. It must publish regulations, establisn a national job list
mechanism for laid-off airline employees, develop program machinery and
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linages to disburse benefits, investigate violations of the first right
of hire and review state determinations of eligibility, and constitute a
labor-management advisory committee.
Similar problems of administrative funding for Redwoods occurred.
Monies were appropriated for benefit payments in Redwoods but no money
for personnel was formally designated to develop or operate the program.
Much of the criticism of the Redwood Employee Protection Program can be
traced to tnis sams deficiency.
The Airline Employee Protection Program suffered the same staffing
problems as did the Redwood program. Staffing requirements were
fulfilled in a ad hoo manne- of borrowing staff from other programs,
or fices and agencies, hiring temporary and part-time personnel, and
utilizing tne Departmental budgetary lapse rate on full-time positions
(rT?) to fund positions on an "as available" basis. The Employment and
.raining Administration contracted the development and operation of tne
National Listing of Air Carrier Jobs to the South Carolina State
employment Security Agency. The establishment of that project was funded
by Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) Title III (Secretary
oi Labor's discretionary funds.) Consistent with the Administration's
anti-employee protections position, the 0MB has steadfastly opposed the
inclusion oi positions lor the purpose of developing the program.
Ironically, if personnel are borrowed from other tasks to do this kind of
implementation work, the 0MB may question the necessity of those
positions to performing the original tasks, or may call into question the
need to perform the original tasks at all. As a result, program managers
are hesitant to supply personnel to be borrowed for program start-up.
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A second functional problem concerned the omission of any enforcement
° P lrljUnatl '/S P0“^3 t0 ^ «--l*r. to comply Ml th the first
rl8bt ° f hir9
- MhUe thSr9 1S “ *>“«»• Sub poena-like statement
Secretar y may require each such air carrier to file with the
Secretary the reports, data, and other information necessary to fulfill
bis duties, 1,15 no mention of judicial recourse, sanctions against
violators, or remedies for victims is made. It was the interpretation of
the Solicitor of Labor that the maximum extent of the action that the
Department could take to assiats laid-of f airline workers alleging
violation of them first right of hire was to employ moral suasion and
conciliation on their behalf with the ailegedly offending airline. Thus,
tne Department's Labor-Management Services Administration was very
limited in the action it could take if violations were found to occur.
whether airline workers alleging denial of their first right of hire will
nave access to the courts under the Act is still an open and untried
question. Nevertheless, from a programmatioai aspect, designing a
coherent and logical process of investigating and resolving complaints
was seriously encumbered by the statutory omission.
Inherent political and philosophical conflicts proved to be the next
category of problems. As mentioned earlier, tne Administration showed
little enthusiasm for employee protections in general and opposed the
inclusion of any employee protections in the airline deregulation
legislation throughout its development.
A- ter tne ADA became law the focus of attention turned to the benefit
levels and paycaps. 0M3 interest was intense. 0MB desired the minimal,
politically feasible, benefit payments. Suffice it to say that extensive
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negotiations transpired which delayed incorporation of the benefit levels
and payoaps into the proposed regulations, thus slowing the entire
process or developing regulations.
Another impediment was the Civil Aeronautics Board. In the early
days after enactment, the Civil Aeronautics Board displayed little
inter.it in establishing a procedure for determining
"qualifying
dislocations." The CAB was primarily concerned with the considerable
changes of philosophy, scope and operations mandated by the law that more
directly Impacted the CAB. As a consequence, little emphasis was
attributed to Section 43 wherein the CAB served only as a catalyst for
activity that would directly Impact another agency but could only
indirectly affect the CA3.
line last type of problem examined herein is categorized as oeing
intramural, i.e., within the Department of Labor. This type of problem
t00k two f'orms: confusion due to two organizational lines of authority
and competition between Agencies. Confusion developed as a result of
i if r used Departmental leadership. This confusion seemed to occur as a
byproduct of the structure of the executive level task force tnat, along
witn the staff level task force, had been created by the Secretary in
anticipation of passage of the Act. That executive level task force
assumed initial policy making responsibilities for the program and,
subsequently, provided guidance and direction to the staff level task
roree in the drafting of the proposed regulations and in the origination
oi program structures. At the same time, however, the Assistant
Secretaries utilized their prerogative of direct access to the Secretary
whenever decisions unfavoraole to their Agencies were rendered by the
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executive level task force. Henceforth, the Secretary's Office took an
increasingly active role in decision-making while the Under Secretary and
ms task group played a correspondingly less active role. Out of this
com usion, the Under Secretary requested the Decision Memoranda in order
to make sense of the contested issues and, subsequently, to assign
responsibilities for the Act between LMSA and ETA.
Another intramural problem within the Department on the
micro-organizational level was the resultant sharing of jurisdictions
between LMSA and ETA and the concomitant competition. In the areas of
the benefit levels, eligibility determinations and the national job
listing, incongruous delegations of authority exacerbated some of the
partisan views held in each Agency. The issuance of formal delegations
or authority in a Secretary's Order did not alleviate some of the
nonsensical relationships that had developed as the respective Agencies
extended themselves into areas of natural interest early on in tne
process. As a matter of fact, the formal delegations of authority only
reflected these early efforts and institutionalized them, e.g., LMSA was
delegated policy authority for the development and general operating
procedures of the airline job list while ETA was made responsible for the
day-to-day operations of the list. Since ETA already sets national
policy and continually monitors the Nation's entire employment security
system (including general job lists and applicant-to-job matching
systems,) it would seem to have made eminently more sense to have
delegated all aspects of the job list to ETA. Apparently, a coraparaDle
problem with clear and logical lines of authority exists in the Redwood
Employee Protection Program (REPP).
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A recently published study conducted by the General Accounting Office
of the REPP concluded that DOL "needs to clarify lines of authority and
responsibility." 16 it also recommended remedial measures and said in
response to the Department of Labor's comment that, "(a)lthough there are
documents formalizing the delegation of authority and assignment of
responsibility for adminstering REPP, our review showed that program
implementation has been hindered by confusion over the roles and
functions of the Labor staff at the local level and that clarification
was needed to correct these problems." 17 While the airline job list
has been activated for test and demonstration purposes, it is unknown
whether problems of lines of authority and responsibility will occur in
the operational mode.
An additional development for LMSA that caused some discontinuity was
uhe resignation of Assistant Secretary Burkhardt in January, 1979 . The
interregnum lasted for approximately six months until Assistant Secretary
Hobgood was sworn in. During the interim, the Agency was administered by
career civil servants whose perspective for policy making and developing
initiatives was politically limited.
This concludes one discussion or the nature of the problems
com ronting tne successful implementation of the Airline Employee
Protection Program. Now attention is directed to see if and how the
Department of Labor identified and resolved these contentious issues and
whether the program components will work if tne program is activated.
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Pragmatic Problem-Solving
In discussing the resoiution or continuation of the proofs
catalogued above, it is important to Keep in mind the major inaependent
tflSt AFlU de ° errnine the success of the program. They are the
~“ leVelS
'
thS2^1^ and the Airline
~ry Coamlt tee . How successfully eacn of these variables are applied
and subsequently function will determine tne ultimate extent of the
positive *<"Pact on airline workers wno are either laid-off or who have
otherwise been adversely affected.
As has been recounted, tne final decision on the level of the
monetary benefits and the associated paycap was, for all practical
Purposes, made by OMB. This controversy exhibited all of the
characteristics of the panoply of problems listed earlier: ( 1 )
inter-organizational problems between OMB, DOT, and DOL; (2) consensus
— -
blems as labor unions Pushed for higher benefits and one
Administration sought to Keep them lower; (3) structural-functional
proolems where tne Secretary of Labor was explicitly directed oy the
legislation to compute the benefit levels and OMB directly intervened and
virtually dictated those guidelines for computations; (4) inherent
Dolitiia l
—
coni iicts within the Executive Branch as demonstrated between





oulties within the Labor Department when both LMSA and
iiA sought to have the rinal authority for the determination of benefit
levels. T.nese intramural difficulties have been resolved for the time
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being; however, since the regulations have yet to be published i„ final
f0™’ 3 P0SSlbUlty
'
n0 “«•- improbable, of a change continues to
exist
.
The first right of hire may very well be the most important of the
three identified independent variables. The first right of hire and its
primary supporting mechanism, the airline employee job vacancy list,
should provide nearly continuous employment opportunities for adversely
affected airline workers in either a stable or growing commerical
aviation environment. But its interpretation and development has
displayed several shared problems with the evolution of the benefit
levels. A serious difficulty was encountered in trying to reach a
consensus of who was eligible to exercise the first right of hire, i.e.,
protected employees versus eligible protected employees, where what made
the difference was whether or not the laid-off worker was determined fey
the CAB to have been laid off as a result of the Airline Deregulation
Act * Tnac equivocation in the legislation is accompanied by another
-law.
-hau i law m the statute is that only carriers certificated on the
dai-e of enactment have the duty to hire. If one were to logically extend
the line of reasoning of reserving airline jobs for those employees laid
oif as a result oi the legislation, then new airlines (those certificated
after enactment) should also have been tasked with the duty to hire.
Other difficulties concerning the first rignt of hire ensued of a
structural and lunctional nature. Proper funding support was not
availaoie nor could an enforcement mechanism be developed wnere none
existed in the legislation. The funding problem has been broached with
OMB m each of tne successive budget cycles since the legislation became
law to little avail. The lack of enforcement powers in effect
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neutralized any meaningful impact of the first right of hire and the
corresponding duty to hire on the part of the airline companies. This
has to be regarded as one of the most serious omissions of the law.
And, as in the monetary benefits variable, tnere were and continue to
persist internal Departmental problems with competing lines of
authority. Tnese ambiguities may cause problems with the job list when
it is activated. Hypothetically speaking, it would seem that as long as
any delegation of authority to ETA for the policy ana operation of the
job last stipulated that LMdA was a customer and, therefore, would be
permitted to request certain information in the system, everyone’s needs
would be satisfied. LMSA's claim to the policy aspect of the joo list
system emanated from its concern for enforcement of the first right of
hire provision. (Ironically, when a policy analysis was made of that
issue, LMSA had no enforcement powers ana, as a result, could not most
effectively utilize the system in seeking to correct employee claims of
right of hire violations.) Nevertheless, the current delegations
continue in effect.
third independent variable is the airline labor-management
advisory committee* It, too, sufiers several deficiencies in common with
the other two variables. There seems to be a lack of consensus among
participants and observers on the scope of the committee. Many parties
apparently want to expand the range of issues to be discussed oeyond the
two specix ied in the law and in its Charter, id est
,
seniority and rehire
procedures. That observation leads directly into the second problem tnat
the committee is experiencing.
The mandate of the committee is far too narrow and disconnected from
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waat are perceived to be the major issues to be successful. The first
meeting has already demonstrated the difficulties that will arise in
restraining the participants from discussing the entire spectrum of
differences that exist between the labor and management positions,
specifically
, those contained in the regulations. Perhaps, a feasible
structural and functional alternative would have been for the Secretary
to nave sought the advice of the existing Secretarial-level Airline
Labor-Management Committee composed of union and airline company
presidents on the two topics stipulated in the law, rather than creating
an entirely new committee expressly for the very limited purpose of
fulfilling the requirement in the law. A lot of effort would undoubtedly
nave been saved by seeking advice on these issues from the Secretary's
Committee
.
Implementation of the Airline Employee Protection Program could have
been enhanced in three ways. First, Section 4 3 of the Airline
Deregulation Act could have been greatly improved by one of two possible
means. Either the legislation could nave empowered the Secretary to
develop employee protections with a general statement of purpose and
intent subject to Congressional review, or the legislation could have
gone so far as to have stipulated the entire process to assist adversely
airected airline employees in an explicit, rational and justifiable
manner giving the Secretary the tools and resources to accomplisn the
task at the initial stage of implementation. Second, the Department of
Labor could have been more coherent in its delegations of authority and
: esponsibility and in its policy making coordination at the uppermost
levels of the Department. This conerence and coordination would
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have occurred to a greater degree dad the Departmental policy makers been
closer to the staff-level proolems. Third, the existence of a
professional program development staff would have provided greater
continuity in practice and in advice in developing the program. This
recommendation to create a small professional staff for employee
protections has gone forward from LMSA to OMB in the Department's budget
quest for r-scal Year 1932 in anticipation of new employee protections
responsibilities and the recent enactment of several laws containing
employee protective provisions requiring immediate action.
Has ougene Bardacn's advice in implementing programs “to achieve
>0 - am objectives, keep costs down, and reduce delay been
followed? He would, no doubt, cringe at the prospect of it taking over
two years to develop and implement a relatively small provision with a
limited constituent impact. And it is still uncertain as to when t.he
program will be put into operation. It is not known if the program has
"achieved program objectives" since it has never been operated and
evaluated ; legislative follow-up may have "kept costs down," possibly too
tar down by not adequately financing the program; and, the initiation of
the program certainly been "delayed." Now, with new leadership, the
Agency is again reviewing tne proposed program and may recommend
legislative revisions which may possibly add two to three years prior to
tne program oeccraing fully operational. Since the transition to an
entirely deregulated airline environment is scheduled to occur over a
o^n-y-ar period, it may very well oe that half or more of that transition
period will have elapsed before adversely impacted airline employees can
utilize the rights and benefits contained in the Airline Deregulation Act
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of 1978. Whether one philosophically agree
concept of employee protections, this kind of
cripples the credibility of the Department,
Government, in satisfying its mandates, present
even if the program is put into operation as
probably will provide little more effect tnan a
s or disagrees with the
delay is destructive and





Tne OutlooK lor Employee Protections
Tne oeeretary of Labor has also been accorded responsibility for new
employee protection provisions contained in several widely diverse laws.
Tne ourface Transportation Assistance Act of 1973 (Small Urban and Rural
program) has been undergoing concurrent implementation. It provided
funding for transportation projects comparable to the Urban Mass
Transportation Act ( UMTA) to small uroan and rural jurisdictions with
populations of less than 50,000. It is currently being administered in
D0L by the Division of Employee Protections in the same fashion
(certifications) as are UMTA grant applications. However, the program is
being scrutinized by the Department of Transportation due to
disagreements between the federal Highway Administration (fHWA) and LMSA
over tne certii ication process and, as a consequence, may be revised in
the future.
The Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1979 contains
provisions for the conversion or discontinuance of unnecessary hospital
services. Section lo42 (c) (1) of the Act also requires the
''certification" of protective arrangements for hospital employees in the
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spirit or the UMTA and Small Urban and Btmaiui D Rural programs. The Act directs
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (now <=,no tne Secretary of
Health and Human Services) "tn oq'-oki-; u^ o establish a program" prior to 1 April
M30. DOL is in tne process of issuing regulations at tnis time.
Implementation of the Hospital program in the Division of Employee
Protections appears to be going smoother tnan has the Airline program.
This implementation may be going smoother because staff expertise in
program development has been fostered and maintained within the Division
(at the staffing expense of other programs.)
Amendments to tne Social Security Act were passed on 9 June 1 9 80.
Contained therein is a confusing and equivocal employee protective
provision which is wide open to limitless interpretation. It apoears to
require tne Secretary of Labor to determine that fair and equitable
arrangements for state employees displaced by Federal takeover of state
disability insurance determination functions nave been made (according to
state law.) In this case the DOL must taxe its cue from the Social
Security Administration to initiate the certification process. It may
very well be that the first step that the Department has taken may be tne
most ^mpj, ^idt. u.t nas requested clarification on its responsibilities
-^nder uto iron uhe solicitor's office. Any recommendations for
implementation must await that response.
L-mited aereguiation of the trucking industry recently became law.
The only employee protective provision that it contained was a
requirement to establish an industry-specific job list akin to the
airline job list. A source close to ETA recently indicated that the
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Agency may incorporate the trucking joos list (along with th, aiPllne,
ioo list) in the Interstate Processing Center (I.P.c.) already located
in Albany, N.Y. This system was developed and implemented after the
Airline National Listing Center was established in South Carolina.
Furthermore, the I.P.C. utilised many of the principles originally
developed for the airlines joo listing.
In the category of prospective legislation, three potential tills
under active consideration contain some employee protective
provisions. The effort to deregulate the rail industry does contain
employee protections. Basicaliy, they are a continuation of existing
government-mandated and industry protections. Therefore, the role of
one Department of Labor or any other government component would oe
relatively minor.
Tne Mental Health Deinstitutionalization Bills (S .1177 and
H.R.7299) under development in Congress contain varying employee
protection measures. The purpose of the legislation is to transition
as many mental patients to community-and home-based living and
treatment arrangements as possiole, wnich may result in the loss of
joos ior employees of affected centralized mental institutions. The
Senate approved S.1177 on 24 July 1980 with extensive employee
protections patterned after Section 13 (c) of UMTA and Section 1642 of
tne Health Planning and Resources Development Act (discussed above.)
On uhe other hand, the House bill which is in committee only provided
i. or retraining assistance for adversely impacted workers. The
dii i erences O: the employee protection provisions can be reconciled in
two alternative ways. The opportunity exists for a Congressman to
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introduce the Senate employee protections provision on the floor of the
House and for the House to adopt It, or, failing that, the House and
senate will be required to attend a joint conference In order to arrive
at identical provisions. If the Senate provision is the one that
eventually prevails, the Secretary of Labor must certify that state
governments have developed acceptable employee protective arrangements
prior to receiving funds from the Department of Health and Human
Services. Again, the model that would probably be utilized for this
provision would be the UMTA 13 (c) certification procedure. Passage of
oni3 legislation prior to adjournment is questionable.
In the area of telecommunications regulatory reform, it appears
that the Communication Workers of America (CWA) and American Telephone
and T-lsgrapn (AT&T) have jointly developed employee protective
arrangements that are mutually acceptable and seif-administered
. Thus,
uhe role or the Labor Department might be non-existent or, at the most,
\ ^ry minor. I- should be noted at this point that, in announcing nis
support for this reform effort, the President stated that when existing
AT&i company structures were altered, "employment, pension, and union
rights or the employees should be protected" , ^an apparent departure
from earlier non-election year positions. This measure may be
legislatively blocked for this session and, therefore, passage is not
anticipated. Tnis completes our recitation of new and prospective
legislation.
While the Department of Labor faces some new laws that may contain
employee protections, the tight budget situation seems to be mandating
against expensive employee protection programs even while efforts to
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deregulate various industries are proceeding at an accelerated pace.
It may Pe that other industries have learned something from the airline
experience, at least in tne area of employee protections. Both laoor
end management in other industries undergoing regulatory reform are
maxing early mediatory efforts to jointly develop employee protection
provisions that are acceptable to Congress, and that require tne
-— ° !
" F9daral Sovernment involvement. Tney may realize that
Federal involvement may give neither of them what they desire nor even
what they can accept in the form of workable employee protections . 20
That may be the lesson learned at the expense of the laid-off airline
workers who after over two years have yet to see any measures




»o»t important approacn to solving,
° P ^ 16331 ameli° ,'ating
' tWs ^oblem i» ^ design policies and
programs that in their basic conception are able to withstand buffeting
by a constantly shifting set of political and social pressures during
the implementation stage.™ 21 It should be obvious at this point that
while the Department of Labor could more or less successfully dispense
with procedural problems in implementing the Airline program, it has
hot, as yet, overcome some of the basic deficiencies of the
1
-gislation
. Tne quality of the employee protection provision in the
law is found wanting. it is a poorly-written, inconsistent,
not-very
-wax 1-t nought-out attempt at legislation. The Administration's
policy of "no policy™ on the issue is clear. Perhaps, if one were more
cynical, one would think that those wno had opposed employee
projections
,
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2 < a '>- The term "merger " as used herein means loirraction by the two carriers whereby they unify corsollrf^p
'
coordinate or pool in whole or rh T ’ n idate, merge,n i in pa t their separate airlineci^ties or any of the operations or services previously uerf-rmedby tnem through such separate facilities.
(h) The term carrier" as used herein refers to either C r
_
.
° r t0 the corporation surviving after consummation of theproposed merger of the two companies.
t
f
rm ”effective date of merger" as used herein shallean the elective date of the amended certificates of public con-venience and necessity transferred to the surviving corporationpursuant to the approval granted in the attached order.
(d) The term "employee" as used herein shall mean an employee ofthe carriers other than a temporary or part-time employee.
Section 3. Insofar as the acquisition or merger affects the
seniority rights of the carriers' employees, provisions shall be madefor the integration of seniority lists in a fair and equitable mannerincluding, where applicable, agreement through collective bargainingbetween the carriers and the representatives of the employees af-
fected. in the event of failure to agree, the dispute may be sub-
mitted by either party for adjustment in accordance with section 13.
Section 4{a). Subject to the apolicable conditions set forth
herein, no employee of either of the carriers involved in the acqui-
sition or merger who is continued in service shall as a result of the
acquisition or merger be placed in a worse position with respect
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to compensation than he occupied immediately prior to his displacement
, / * s ls unable in the normal exercise of his seniority rightsunder existing agreements, rules, and practices to obtain a positionproducing compensation equal to or exceeding the compensation of the
Ihll <fV ^ n 7
hlm lraiEediatel y Prior to such date, except, however,
6 t0 exercise his seniority rights to secure another




e ls eTltl tled under the working agreement and which carries arate o~ pay and compensation exceeding those of the position which heelects to retain, he shall thereafter be treated for the purposes ofth.s section as occupying the position which he elects to decline.
(b) Tne protection afforded by the foregoing paragraph is herebydesignated as a "displacement allowance" which shall be determined in’
each instance in the manner hereinafter described. Any employee
entitled to such an allowance is hereinafter referred to as a "dis-
placed" emplovee.
(c) Each displacement allowance shall be a monthly allowance
determined by computing the total compensation received by the
employee and his total time paid for during the last 12 months in
which he performed service immediately preceding the date of his
displacement ( such 12 months being hereinafter referred to as the
test period") and by dividing separately the total compensation and
the total time paid tor by 12, thereby producing the average monthly
compensation and average monthly time paid for, which shall be the
minimum amounts used to guarantee the displaced employee; and if his
compensation in his current position is less in any month in which he
performs work than the aforesaid average compensation, he shall be
paid the difference, less compensation for any time lost on account of
voluntary absences to the extent that he is not available for service
equivalent to his average monthly time during the test period, but he
shall he compensated in addition thereto at the rate of the position
filled for any time worked in excess of the average monthly time paid
for during the test period.
(d) The protection afforded herein shall only apply to displace-
ments occurring within a period of 3 years from the effective date of
the acquisition cr merger (referred to herein as the claim period);
and the period during which this protection is to be given (referred
to herein as the protective period) shall extend for a period of 4
years from the date on which the employee is displaced.
Section 5(a). Any employee of either of the carriers participat
ing in the acquisition or merger who is deprived of employment as a
result of said acquisition or merger shall be accorded an allowance
132
f hereinafter termed a "dlar,leeal allowance"), based on length of
yelr “’ee^oe
Ca,e °f a" emrlt»’« with 1«« than 1v a o s rvice) shall be a monthly allowance equivalent In eachInstance to 60 percent of the average monthly compensation of theemployee In question during the last 12 months of his employment In -which he earned compensation prior to the date he Is first deprived of
° f th\ ac,’ulsltl °'’ or merger. This dismissalallowance will be made to each eligible employee, while unemployed, bythe surviving carrier during a period beginning at the date he Is
.irst deprived of employment as a result of the acquisition or mergerano extending In each Instance for a length of time determined andlimited by the following schedule:
Length of service (Years)
Period of Payment
Months
] and less than 2 .
2 and less than 3 .
^ and less than 5 .
5 and less than 10








In the case of an employee with less than 1 year of service such
employee shall not be covered by the benefits provided in this
section, hut shall receive such benefits, and only such benefits, as
are provided hy section 7.
(b) For the purpose of these provisions, the length of service
of the employee shall he determined from the date he last acquired an
employment status with the employing carrier and he shall he given
credit for 1 month’s service for each month in which he performed any
service (in any capacity whatsoever) and 12 such months shall be
credited as 1 year’s service. The employment etatus of an employee
shall not be interrupted by furlough in instances where the employee
has a right to and does return to service when called. In determining
length of service of an employee acting as an officer or other offi-
cial representative of an employee organization, he will be given
credit for performing service while so engaged on leave of absence
from the service of the carrier: Provided
,
That in calculating the
dismissal allowance for such an employee, such allowance shall be
based upon the compensation paid such employee by the carrier during
his last 12 months of service on the company payroll and not on the
compensation he may have been paid by the employee representative
organization.
(c) An employee shall not be regarded as deprived of employment
in case of his resignation, death, or retirement on account of age or
disability in accordance with the current rules and practices applies-
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Me to employees generally, dismissal for justifiable cause in accord-
ance with the rules, or furlough because of reduction in forces due to
seasonal requirements of the service; nor shall any employee be re-
garded as deprived of employment as the result of the acquisition or
merger who is not deprived of his employment within 3 years from the
effective date of said acquisition or merger .
(d) Each employee receiving a dismissal allowance shall keep
Tiger International informed of his address and the name and address
of any other person by whom he may be regularly employed.
(e) The dismissal allowance shall be paid to the regularly
assigned incumbent of the position abolished. If the position of an
employee is abolished while he is absent from service, he will be
entitled to the dismissal allowance when he Is available for service.
Hie employee temporarily filling said position at the time it was
abolished will be given a dismissal allowance on the basis of said
position until the regular employee is available for service and
thereafter shall revert to his previous status and will be given a
dismissal allowance accordingly if any is due.
(f) An employee receiving a dismissal allowance shall be subject
to call to return to service after being notified in accordance with
the working agreement, and such employee may be required to return to
the service of the employing carrier for other reasonably comparable
employment for which he is physically and mentally qualified and which
does not require a change in his place of residence, if his return
does not infringe upon the employment rights of other employees under
the working agreement.
(g) If an employee who is receiving a dismissal allowance
returns to service the dismissal allowance shall cease while he is so
reemployed and the period of time during which he is so reemployed
shall he deducted from the total period for which he is entitled to
receive a dismissal allowance. During the time of such reemployment,
however, he shall be entitled to protection in accordance with the
provisions of section 4.
(hi If an employee who is receiving a dismissal allowance
obtains other employment, his dismissal allowance shall he reduced to
the extent that the sum total of his earnings in such employment plus
his allowance and any unemployment insurance benefit (or similar
benefit) exceed the amount upon which hi3 dismissal allowance is
based: Provided : That this shall not apply to employees with less
than I year’s service.
(1) A dismissal allowance shall cease prior to. the expiration
of
its prescribed period in the event of
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1* Failure without good cause to return to service after being
notified of a position for which he is eligible and as
provided in paragraphs ( f ) and (g);
?. Resignation;
3. Death
4. Retirement or on account of age or disability in accordance
with the current rules and practices applicable to employees
generally;
5. Dismissal for justifiable cause.
Section 6. An employee affected by the acquisition or merger
shall not during the applicable protective period be deprived of be-
nefits attaching to his previous employment
,
such as hospitalization,
relief, and the like.
Section 7. Any employee eligible to receive a dismissal allow-
ance under section 5 hereof may, at his option at the time of acqui-
sition or merger
,
resign and (in lieu of all other benefits and prot
ections provided in these provisions) accept in a lump sum a separa-
tion allowance determined in accordance with the following schedule:
Separation allowance
Length of service (Years) (Wonths* nay)
1 and less than 2 3
2 and less than 3 6
3 and less than 5 9
5 and over 12
In the case of employees with less than 1 year’s service, 5 days’ pay,
at the straight time rate per working day of the position last occu-
pied, for each full month in which they performed service will be paid
as the lump sum.
(a) Length of service shall be computed as provided in section
5.
(b) One month’s pay shall be computed by multiplying by 30 the
calendar daily rate of pay received by the employee in the position
last occupied prior to the time of the acquisition or merger.
Section 8(a). Any employee who is retained in the service of the
carrier surviving the acquisition or merger (or who is later restored^
to service from the group of employees entitled to receive a
dismiss*-
allowance) who is required to change the point of his employment as a
result cf such acquisition or merger and is therefore required
to
his place of residence shall be reimbursed for all expenses of
moving
his household and other personal effects and for the
traveling ex-
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all °wed unless they are incurred within 3 years from
. e ective date of the acquisition or merger
,
and the claim mustbe submitted within 00 days after the expenses aie incurred
fb) Changes in place of residence subsequent to the initialCaused by the ac0ui3ition or merger which grew out of thenormai exercise of seniority in accordance with working agreements arenot comprehended within the provisions of this .section.




e 3ppIlcable ln ea°b instance, to any employee who isretained in the service of the carriers involved in this acquisition
or merger (or who is later restored to such service from the group of
employees entitled to receive a dismissal allowance) who is requiredto change tne point of his employment as a result of such acquisition
or merger and is therefore required to move his place of residence.
1. If the employee owns his own home in the locality from which
he is required to move, he shall at his option be reimbursed
by the carrier for any loss suffered in the sale of his home
j-or less than its fair value. In each case the fair value of
the home in question shall be determined as of a date





that if the home is
not sold within a substantial period of time after the
acquisition or merger, then the fair value of the home shall
be determined as of a date as closely related to the date of
sale as possible, with an agreed-upon adjustment being made
to exclude any effect of the acquisition or merger on such
Pair value. The carrier shall in each instance be afforded an
opportunity to purchase the home at such fair value before it
is sold by the employee to any other party.
2. If the employee is under a contract to purchase his home, the
carrier shall protect him against loss to the extent of the
fair value of any equity he may have in the home and in
addition shall relieve him from any further obligations under
his contract.
If the employee holds an unexpired lease of a dwelling
occupied by him as hi3 home, the carrier shall protect him




(b) Changes In place of residence subsequent to the initial
change caused by the acquisition or merger which grow out of the
normal exercise of seniority in accordance with working agreements are
not comprehended within the provisions of this section.
(c) No claim for loss shall be paid under the provisions of this
section which is not presented within 3 years after the effective date
of the acauisition or merger.
(d) Should a controversy arise in respect to the value of the
home, the loss sustained in its sale, the loss under contract for
purchase, loss and cost in securing termination of lease, or any other
question in connection with these matters, it shall be decided through
joint conference between the employee or his representative and the
carrier, and in the event they are unable to agree, the dispute may be
referred by either party to a board of three competent real estate
appraisers, selected in the following manner: One to be selected by
the employee or his representative and one by the carrier, respec-
tively; these two shall endeavor by agreement within 10 days after
their appointment to select the third appraiser or to select some
person authorized to name the third appraiser; and in the event of
failure to agree, then the Chairman of the National Mediation Board
shall be requested to appoint the third appraiser. A decision of a
majority of the appraisers shall be required, and said decision shall
be final and conclusive. The salary and expenses of the third or
neutral appraiser, including the expenses of the appraisal board,
shall be borne equally by the parties to the proceedings. All other
expenses shall be paid by the party incurring them, including the
salary of the appraiser selected by such party.
Section 10. If either carrier, on or after July 19, 1979, shall
rearrange or adjust its forces in anticipation of the acquisition or
merger, with the purpose or effect of depriving an employee of
benefits to which he should be entitled under these provisions as an
employee immediately affected by the acquisition or merger
,
these
provisions shall apply to such an employee as of the date when he is
so affected.
Section 11. shall jointly or severally give
at least 45 days* written notice containing a full and adequate state-
ment of the proposed changes to he effected by the acquisition or
merger, including an estimate of the number of employees of each
class, craft, or field of endeavor affected by the intended changes.
Such notice shall be posted on bulletin boards or other conspicuous
places convenient to the employees of said carriers, and a copy of the
notice shall be sent by registered mail to all authorized representa-
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submitted by either party for adjustment acc^dan'ce ^“ctX
Of ein5M?ltiTorThn^n:t?^nn^rd:r^h:T^aTfat^T‘iT
not^thi^the cla^
emp* 0yment ^ the surviving carrier that ist within the lass, craft, or field of endeavor in which he wasemployed by either carrier on the date of the attached order.
Section 13(a). In the event that any dispute or controversv




provlded hereln ^hicb cannot be settled by the partiesw thin? 0 days after the controversy arises, it may be referred by any
l ll v
“ ar*ltrator selected from a panel of seven names furnishedby the National Mediation Board for consideration and determination.The parties shall select the arbitrator from such panel by altema-tiveiy striking names until only one remains, and he shall serve as
arbitrator. Expedited hearings and decisions will be expected, and adecision shall be rendered within 90 days after the controversy
arises, unless an extension of time is mutually agreeable to allparties. The salary and expenses of the arbitrator shall be borne
equally by the carrier and (i) the organization or organizations
representing the employee or employees or (i i) if unrepresented, the
employee or employees or group or groups of employees. The decision
of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on the parties.
(b) The above condition shall not apply if the parties by mutual
agreement determine that an alternative method for dispute settlement
or an alternative procedure for selection of an arbitrator is appro-
priate in their particular dispute. No party shall be excused from
complying with the above condition by reason of having suggested an
alternative method or procedure unless and until that alternative
method or procedure shall have been agreed to by all the parties.
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lnS bls principal place of residence.(d) Huty to Hire Protected Employees.— (1) Each person who isa protected employee of an air carrier which is subject to regulation bythe Civil Aeronautics Board who is furloughed or otherwise term>nat
fi
d> s"ch “ air carrier on account of a qualifying dislocation
shall have first right of hire, in order of seniority and regardless of















birin£ additional employees shall havea duty to hire such a person before they hire any other person, exceptthat such air earner may recall any of its own furloughed employeesbefore hiring such a person. Any employee who is furloughed or other-








a wcar?er Hnder the provisions of this subsection,
ca?Jlr
<
Jw l1S 1 ngbtS,°f and nght of recall with the airrrie that furloughed or terminated him.
(?) *5aSmmng °,n tbe date on 'toich monthly assistance payments
under this section begin, the Secretary shall establish, maintain, and
periodically publish a comprehensive list of jobs available with air
earners certificated under section 401 of the Federal Aviation Act of19d8. Such list shall include that information and detail, such as iobdescriptions and required skills, the Secretary deems relevant and
necessaiw. In addition to publishing the list, the Secretary shall make
every effort to assist an eligible protected employee in finding other
employment. Any individual receiving monthly assistance payments
moving expenses, or reimbursement payments under this section shall’
as a condition to receiving such expenses or payments, cooperate fullv
with the Secretary in seeking other employment. In order to carry out
his responsibilities under this subsection, the Secretary may require
each such air carrier to file with the Secretary the reports, data and
other information necessary to fulfill his duties under this subsection.
(3) In addition to making monthly assistance or reimbursement
payments under this section, the Secretary shall encourage negotia-
tions between air carriers and representatives of eligible protected em-
ployees with respect to rehiring practices and seniority.
(e) Period of Monthly Assistance Payments.— (1) Monthly as-
sistance payments computed under subsection (b) for a protected em-
ployee who has been deprived of employment shall be made each
month until the recipient obtains other emploj-ment, or until the end
of the 36 months occurring immediately after the month such pay-
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adOPted by^ H°USeS Stating a^t th® Congress ap-
(3) For purposes of this subsection, the term “legislative dav”
M HoaXS?' °»*«»™ in iion.Kg) airuxe Employees Protective Account.—All paymentsunder this section shall be made by the Secretary from a sepaite ac-count niaintained in the Treasury of the United States to bePknown asthe Airline Employees Protective Account. There is authorized to beappropnated to such account annually, beginning with the fiscal yearending September 30, 1979, such sums as are necessary to carry ouUhepurposes of this section, including amounts necessary for the adminis-
of thisSoTS °f thC SeCretai'y rekted t0 carO’>ng out the provision
(]\) bmxmoxs.—For the purposes of this section
—
The Jerm “protected employee” means a person who, on thedate or enactment of this section, has been employed for at least 4 yearsby an air carrier holding a certificate issued under section 401 of the
federal Aviation Act of 1958. Such term shall not include any mem-
bei s of the Board of Directors or officers of a corporation.
(2) The term “qualifying dislocation” means a bankruptcy or major
contraction of an air carrier holding a certificate under section 401 of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, occurring during the first 10 com-
plete calendar years occurring after the date of enactment of the Air
Transportation Regulatory Reform Act of 1978, the major cause of
which is the change in regulatory structure provided by the Air Trans-
portation Regulatory Reform Act of 1978, as determined by the Civil
Aeronautics Board.
(3) The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of Labor.
(4) The term “major contraction” means a reduction by at least 15
percent of the total number of full-time employees of an air carrier
within a 12-month period. Any particular reduction of less than 15
percent may be found by the Board to be part of a major contraction
of an air carrier if the Board determines that other reductions are
likely to occur such that within a 12-month period in which such par-
ticular reduction occurs the total reduction will exceed 15 percent.
In computing a 15-percent reduction under this paragraph, the Board





he provisions of this section shall terminate
Action
'^ t lC SeCretflr
*
V is re(luired ‘o make a payment under*hU
I/3AN GUARANTY
.jf'f Tbf ^titled “An Act to provide for Government guar-anty of pm ate loans to certain air carriers for purchase of modem
aircraft and equipment, to foster the development and use of modem
a
L
lc™ft /Vsuch carriers and ior
.
other Purposes” approvedSeptember i, 19o7 (49 Ij.S.C. 1324 note), is amended as follows*
U) Section 3 of such Act is amended to read as follows
:
Sec 3. The Secretary is hereby authorized to guarantee any lender
against loss of principal or interest on any aircraft purchase loan madeby such lender to (a) any air carrier holding a certificate to engage in
local an; transportation from the Civil Aeronautics Board or (bfanv
an- earner holding a certificate of public convenience and necessity for
ocal or regional air service issued by the Board: such guaranty shallbe made in such form, on such terms and conditions, and pursuant to
such regulations, as the Secretary deems necessary and which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.”.
.
(2 ). Section 4(c) of such Act is amended bv striking out “10” and
inserting m lieu thereof “15”.
(0)
Section 4(d) of such Act is amended bv striking out “$30,000.-
000 and inserting in lieu thereof “$100,000,000”.
(4) Section 8 of such Act is amended bv striking out “twenty” and
inserting in lieu thereof “25”.
AIRPORT AM) AIRWAY DEVELOPMENT ACT AMENDMENTS
Sec. 24. Section 11 of the Airport and Airway Development Act (49
U.S.C. 1711) is amended as follows
:
(1)
Paragraph (1) of such section 11 is amended to read as follows:
“(1) ‘air carrier airport’ means
—
“(A) an airport which, on December 31, 1978, was an air
carrier airport (as that term was defined on that date)
;
and
“(B) an existing public airport regularly served, or a new
f
mblic airport which the Secretary determines will be regu-
arly served, by an air carrier certificated by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board under section 401 of the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958, and a commuter airport.”.
(2)
Paragraph (7) of such section 11 is amended bv (A) striking out
“401(a)” and inserting in lieu thereof “422(a)”: and (B) inserting
“or operating under a certificate issued bv the Civil Aeronautics Board
under section 420 of such Act,” immediately after “1958”.
MISCELLANEOUS
Sec. 25. The table of contents for the Federal Aviation Act of 105''
is amended as follows
:
(a) Strike out “Sec. 102. Declaration of policy: The Board." and insert in
lieu thereof the following item
:
Sec. 102. Declaration of policy : The Board.
“(a) Interstate and overseas air transportation.
“(b) All-cariro air transportation.
“(c) Foreign air transportation."
49
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ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR ZORINSKY
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the pro^osis for the airline industry
iort^ fffmJc f^ legislation. ! say at the outset that I have suS-tta llrlme “*“•** ‘° * 1« ^gulated, frePe
f






^ a result of ** return to^mS^petiti™environment, expansions and contractions may occur in the marketPlace. Employment may commensurately also^^e^d and coiliract
_Iff




cameP wdJ. v®fy hkely enter the marketplace,
newemp^oyment.^
emplo
^ed mdlvlduals> as a result, may need to seek
meA
Ired” VT?Psions tha* 1 support will thereforesn perfectly with this expanding competitive environment.
JUSTIFICATION F0B ANT LABOR PROTECTION WHATSOEVER






certam airlme employee organizations to seek
!fr^I
protection provisions, or oppose the legislation. Because of thispressure such provisions were dratted.
_ 03Jc
eP,is no disagreement with the Committee as to the probable
nexus between the dislocation and this legislation.
, p,tia.l threshold that must be logically crossed is whether or notthe dislocation probably caused by this legislation merits anv labor
protection. As the Committee report persuasively articulates there isprecedent for protective provisions, but the precedents are however,
analogous only to those provisions defeated by the 8-6 vote, not to
wiiat is proposed by the Committee. Therefore, the only disagreement
is the remedy that is to be afforded the dislocated employee.
COMPARISON OP OUR ALTERNATIVES VS. COMMITTEE’S PROVISIONS
.
The provision I support would assist those previously emploved byimmediately giving them priority in the hiring process of other ex-
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panding cjm-iers. Clearly this amendment seeks to take advantageof the ebb and flow of the free enterprise system. The dislocated em-
finn '
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ternative 5 the Committee has authorized a fund to provide
SecS^o7Labor











rier OCCurs - However> the Secretary is given dis-











statutory language requires that protected em-






e benefits.” Since airline employees aresome of the highest paid in the nation, and receive generous fringebenefits, and since the legislation allows payments to an individualfor a three year period, the amount of money from the federal treas-
uShinkable






1. Pilots, copilots, and engineers
_
Those likely to be furloughed—sample No. 25,665"
1. Inflight personnel
Those likely to be furloughed—sample No7 33^844_V
Maintenance personnel.
Those likely to be furloughed—sample No. 36 531
Reservation and sales.
Those likely to be furloughed—sample No?21739
5. Recordkeeping and statutes
_

















Depending on the mix of employeet furloughed
Reasonable example:
1,000 pilots, et cetera times $22,000
3.500 Inflight times $13,241
1.500 maintenance times $12,000
1,000 reservation times $14,219






Total (6,000-1-134,802=4.43 percent) 90,303,600
Consequently, for 6,000 persons or 4.45% of the airline industry, 1
year s unemployment could cost the federal treasury nearly $100 mil-
lion dollars. These figures are a minimum because they do not reflect
fringe benefits and are taken from the CAB Form #41 for the first
quarter of 1977, which does not reflect inflation to date.
Even worse is the possibility of an airline going bankrupt. The cost
escalates geometrically. No longer are we dealing with those likely to
b® furloughed, but rather with some of the highest paid employees in
the industry. I wonder if the general public is willing to support from
it s tax dollars a senor pilot at $100,000 a year, not to mention fringe
benefits. The cost of the Committee’s employee protection provision
could conceivably cost the treasury $1,000,000,000.00 (one billion dol-




What in essence the Committee has constructed is a new, unemploy-'
ment compensation program for airline employees. I find it abhorrent
that the nation’s taxpayers are being called upon to bail out the execu-
tives of the nation’s airline industry for their bad business decisions by
compensating their employees. This remedy is especially noxious in
light of the ability of the free enterprise system resulting from the
thrust of this legislation as a whole to remedy the employment problem
here in question.
ARGUMENTS
First. In support of this existing provision, the Committee says that
the concept of employee protection is not new to the U.S. airline
industry.
REBUTTAL
This is true, but this statement begs the question. As I previously
stated, the remedy here provided is a strong departure from past prece-
dent. Protection is not new, but this remedy is new and without prece-
dent in this industry.
ARGUMENTS
Second. The Committee states that this industry is “unique” because
of the degree to which it is regulated by the federal government.
REBUTTAL
Many industries are regulated to varying degrees by the federal
government To single out this industry as ‘‘unique” is illogical. Who
can say that the ultimate effect on the airline industry economy by
CAB regulation is greater than the EPA’6 economic* effect on the
steel industry. Does not the trucking industry have analogous regu-
lation by the ICC. Quite frankly, OSHA’s effect on the small busi-
nesses may be just as much in degree by it’s economic effect on those
businesses as the CAB is on the airline industry. To single out the
airline industry as being “uniquely” qualified for this type of remedy
is simply without foundation.
Consequently I doubt that this so-called “unique” quality of the
airline industry will preclude these provisions from being utilized
as a precedent in the future. To the contrary, every labor organzation
working in any type of regulated industry will seize this opportunity
to seek this remedy if and when relief is perceived as necessary. The
“unique” quality of this precedent will pale in the light of such
pressure.
There is no disagreement that such a precedent would be injurious
to the nation’s treasury and economic well being.
The text of my empioyee protection provision follows
:
EMPLOYEE PROTECTION PROGRAM
(a) Durr to Hire Protected Employees.—Each person who is a
protected employee of an air carrier which is subject to regulation by
the Civil Aeronautics Board who is furloughed or otherwise termi-
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nated by such an air earner on account of a qualifying dislocation,
shall have first right of hire, in order of seniority and regardless of
a^e, m his occupational specialty, by any other such carrier hiring
additional employees. Kadi such air carrier hiring additional employ-
ees shall have a duty to hire such a person before they hire any otherperson, except that such air carrier may recall any of its own fur-loughed employees before hiring such a person. Any employee who isfurloughed or otherwise terminated on account of a qualifying dis-location, and who is hired by another air carrier under the provisions
°
•^ subsection, shall retain his rights of seniority and right to recallAvith the air earner that furloughed or terminated him. The Secre-
[-2 “f11 'stilish, maintain and periodically publish a comprehen-
5ni nffi°WS a,va.lla.bl® Wltb carrier certificated under section401 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. Such list shall include thatinformation and detail such as job descriptions and required skills,
!hp





“ft 0tl?Cr emPloymc»t- In order to carry out hisP lbihties under this subsection, the Secretary may require eachsuch air carrier to file with the Secretary the reports, data^and othermformatmn necessary to fulfill his duties under this subsection
and reneflF
E
c4^rK i:GULA’!?0KS'T ^ * * The SecretaiT may issue, amend,
admSratfon of th?S *^nf ^ “S U for
A11. ry,Iesi and regulations shall be submitted to the Congresson the date that they are proposed by the Secretary. Such rules and
regulations shall become effective 60 legislative days after the datethey were submitted to the Congress, unless during that 60-day period
either House adopts a resolution stating that that House disapproves
such rules or regulations, except that such rules or regulations maybecome effective on the date, during such 60-day period, that a resolu-
tion has been adopted by both Houses stating that the Congress ap-proves of them. ^ r
(3) For purposes of this subsection, the term “legislative day”
means a calendar day on which both Houses of Congress are in session.
( c ) Definitions.—For the purposes of this section
—
(1 ) The term ‘‘protected employee” means a person who, on the date
of enactment of this section, has been employed by an air carrier hold-
ing a certificate issued under section 401 of the Federal Aviation Act
°i r £>
for ttt Ieast 4 years - Such term shall not include any members
of the Board of Directors or officers of a corporation.
.
(2 ) The term “qualifying dislocation” means a contraction of an
air carrier holding a certificate under section 401 of the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958, Air Transportation Regulatory Reform Act, the
major cause of which is the change in regulatory structure provided by
the Air Transportation Regulatory Reform Act of 1977, as determined
by the Civil Aeronautics Board.
(3) The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of Transportation.
(4) The term “major contraction” means a reduction of the total
number of full-time employees of an air carrier within a 12-month
period except .for those employees who are deprived of employment
because of a strike.
(d) Termination.—The provisions of this section shall terminate
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up services that are unprofitable to the bigger companies.
F
™sis hardlv drastic deregulation, but it promises at least to loosen
the tight gnp the CAB has over where and when airlines may operate
*nd how much they may charge.
There’s no assurance, however, that even so mild a change will make
n through Congress. The move toward deregulation started during
President Ford’s administration and was firmly endorsed by President
Carter, yet legislation has only now emerged from a Senate committee.
It s uncertain that the full Senate will act on it before adjournment
this year and if the bill wins approval there, it faces a doubtful future
10 the House where resistance to deregulation seems even stronger.
Whether the Senate committee’s action is the “breakthrough
. . .
to remove outdated regulatory burdens” that President Carter called
it remains to be seen. Pro-regulation lobbyists will be out in force to
scuttle the legislation.
While officials of the big airlines talk a good competitive game, most
of them like the mothering their companies have been getting from the
CAB. They like the cozy arrangement under which the airlines and
the CAB divide up the territories and then the CAB keeps off poachers.
Likewise, the unions of airline workers oppose deregulation because
they fear jobs may be lost or shuffled around during tne boat rocking
that would result from freer competition.
In an apparent attempt to sweeten the bill for labor, the drafters
included a provision providing federal financial assistance to em-
out of work by a bankrupty or major cutback of an airline
? new competitive pressures produced by the legislation.
Sen. Edward Zorinsky, D-Neb., has reservations, as we do, about this
provision, which appears to require the government to reimburse such
employes for up to three years in an amount equal to the wages and
fringe benefits they were receiving. Senator Zorinsky called it a misuse
of taxpayers’ money—a “raid on tne treasury.”
There is talk that similar provisions will be included in legislation
to deregulate other industries. If the government does this for workers
in the airline industry, how can it refuse to do the same for, say, truck
drivers who might be displaced by introducing freer competition into
the trucking industry f
Some dislocations, perhaps even substantial ones, probably are in-
evitable in opening an industry to competitive market forces. But if
deregulation works as anticipated by its supporters, more jobs ought
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to result, not fewer. The question is whether the government should
guarantee full income to workers displaced as a result of deregulation
when it does not do so for workers who lose their jobs for other
reasons.
.
Senator Zorinsky is right to question such a precedent. Deregula-
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Hil™6 tha^ a*er enactment of this bill the airlinesor the first time will be principally responsible to market forces ratherthan government regulation. Airlines will undoubtedly differ in their
ability to succeed in the new market oriented environment. The Com-
mittee does not believe that this difference in competitive ability will
cause system contractions, but rather different levels of growth There
is certainly a possibility, however, that one or more airlines will
encounter such difficulties in adjusting that they will lose enough traffic
to cause a major reduction in their total labor force. “
The theoretical possibility that a major reduction might occur in thelabor force of one or more airlines is the primary source for the serious
concern expressed about this bill by many airline employees and their
labor representatives. The Committee felt that this concern should not
be ignored and that careful consideration of the question of employee
protection programs was warranted. The Committee concluded that
the kind of employee dislocations that might occur as a result of the
.new regulatory structure should be dealt with by a statutory employee
protection program, as has been done in certain cases in the past.
The fundamental reason why this regulatory reform bill should in-
clude an employee protection program is that for 40 years the U.S air-
line industry has been regulated in all of its most economically signif-
icant aspects, including entry, exit, and pricing. This regulation has
protected from competition the fares and routes of certificated air-
lines, thus protecting their traffic and revenue as well. An air-
line s traffic and revenue is of course the key to its economic well-bemg-and its need for and ability to pay employees. Regulation has,
therefore, had the effect of reducing the potential for major employ-
ment reductions in individual airlines (at the same time, however,
reducing potential increases not only in each airline but in the industry
as a whole).
An additional aspect of the regulatory system which has had pro-
tectionist value to employees has been that certificates have become
extremely valuable as a result of entry restrictions. Because of the
value of their certificates, airlines in serious financial difficulty have
without exception been able to merge with stronger airlines, thereby
avoiding bankruptcy or substantial system contraction. A statutory
condition for merger has been CAB approved. Such approval has been
forthcoming onlv if the merger agreement contained a satisfactory
program for employee protection.
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ementof the present bill is the gradual phasing in of
pSlSTw'IT The Committee accepted without controversy theinciple that a transition period should be provided to airline a>m-
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because of their age. Since employees will nofbe
fhp/o
ad]ust the sense t^®lr employers can, the Committee believest at a reasonable program of transition assistance should be provided.
inWrf wfll the Committee has determined that the publicnterest will be bpt served by a more competitive system in which air-line management has greater discretion with respect to routes and
prices. Because it is the public who will benefit from the regulatory
reform provided for in this bill, the public should be willing to assume
reasonably close to the full cost of such reform, including the cost of
transition for any dis ocnted employees. The Committee believes thatthe f
c^
nRre^s, on behalf of the American people, must insure that the
benefits to the public which result from its decision to alter substan-
tially the reflation of air transportation are not paid for by a minor-ity—the airline employees and their families who have relied on the
present system.
Critics of the employee protection program argue that airline em-
ployees are no more deserving of protection against dislocations re-
sulting from regulatory reform than employees in any other area of
private industry who mav be harmed as a result of Government ac-
tions (such as cancellation of a Government contract or establishment
of pollution or occupational safety standards) that have adverse effects
on their employers. The Committee disagrees. The air transportation
industry is one of the few industries in the United States which is so
comprehensively regulated, and thus immune from normal market
forces. It is because of the past decisions of Congress to require such
regulation that the present air transportation system has developed
as it has. In order to conduct their operations, the airline comnanies
had no choice but to comply with these regulations. This forced com-
pliance led to n justifiable reliance on the stability of the regulatory
structure. The Committee believes that Congress, having acted to ore-
vent the normal fr*»e market evolution of the industry, now ha= a duty
to the industry and its employees which would not exist if such action
had not been taken. Tn order for Congress responsibly to change its
policy nov and require the industry to move toward a much more
competitive market oriented environment. Congress should attempt
to minimise the dislocations caused by the change. The change in
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the accompanying increased employment opportuni-
ties that will result from enactment of this bill will alleviate a gooddeal of anxiety and opposition to similar regulatory reform effortsin the future.
The alternatives are clear: continued regulation and thus a continu-ing economic loss to the public, versus decreased regulation and, there-
fore, decreased loss to the public, potentially paid for by a temporary
assistance program. y *
Featuree of the employee protection program
The employee protection program fashioned by the committee limits
as much as possible the potential expenditure of Government funds
wlnle providing a comprehensive program of protection for dislocated
einployees.
In order to be eligible for assistance an employee must have at least 4
years full-time experience with a certificated airline as of the date of
enactment. These protected employees would then be eligible for mone-
tary compensation in the event of job Joss, relocation, or reduction in
wages suffered in connection with a bankruptcy or “major contraction'’
of their employer which occurred within the first 10 years of enact-
ment and which was in major part caused by the change in the regula-
tory structure brought about by the act as determined by the Board.
The requirement for 4 years experience is included because the com-
mittee believes that employees with 3 years or less seniority have not
relied to a substantial enough degree on the present system to warrant
{
irotection. They have made less of a commitment to a particular air-
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ie m an environment relatively unfettered
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constraints. Because of the particular transitional provi-
sions m the bill (for example, some automatic entry protection phases
out in 3 years, the remainder in 5 years, and section 406 subsicfy willphase out in
<
years), by the end of the 10-vear period the carriers’
competitive capabilities will have been tested and the successes orfailures of adjustment to the new climate demonstratedA major contraction” is defined as a reduction by at lea=t 15 per-
cent of the total number of full-time employees of the employing
carrier occurring within a 12-month period. Strike-related reduc-
tions will not be counted for this purpose. The 15-percent figure was
chosen as the lowest figure consistent with the desire to avoid CABdeterminations of causality with respect to dislocations caused by
normal economic fluctuations. In the last 20 years, there have been
only a few non-sti ike-related instances when the 15-percent level has
been exceeded. The 15-percent test was chosen not only in order to
reduce the number of CAB investigations, but also because the com-
mittee felt that assistance should only be made available if the em-
ploying carrier were in major financial difficulty. Otherwise, the pro-
tection offered in the collective bargaining agreement should be relied
upon. Any particular reduction of less than 15 percent would, never-
theless, constitute a major contraction if the Board determined that
other reductions were likely to occur such that the test would be satis-
fied. This provision is intended to give displaced workers in clear cases
the ability to receive assistance without their having to wait a full
year before becoming eligible.
Under the program, each regulated air carrier is required to give
priority hiring to displaced employees who satisfy the eligibility re-
quirement as described above. Thus, few such employees would be
without work for a long period of time. In addition if compensation
payments began, the Secretary of Labor would be required to periodi-
cally publish a list of available jobs in aeronautics and related indus-
tries. Employees receiving compensation payments would be required
to accept “reasonably comparable” employment or else lose a portion
of their benefits, except that if the new job required relocation, the em-
ployee could elect not to relocate but would receive benefits for a
shorter period. The provisions are intended to place on the employees
the reasonable requirement of seeking and accepting available em-
ployment while still providing assistance where necessary. The inter-
action of these provisions will decrease the cash payments required
•under the program.
Eligible employees who lost their jobs would be entitled to monthly
assistance payments for a maximmp of 3 years or until they were re-
employed, whichever occurred first. The amount of such payment
would be equal to a percentage of former wages, as determined by reg-
ulations promulgated by the Department of Labor. These regulations
will be subject to congressional review. The commitee considered set-
ting statutory percentage figures and maximum dollar amounts, but
concluded that the Secretary of Labor, after consultation with the
Secretary of Transportation, will be in a better position to determine
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the appropriate amounts. The committee intends that the percental
chosen will result in compensation payments that are less than the
employees after-tax income in order to preserve maximum incentives
for employees to secure comparable work.
An eligible employee suffering a reduction in wages, would be
entitled to receive a percentage of the decrease in wages, as set forth
iii regulations of the Department of Labor, determined pursuant to
the preceding paragraph. Again, the maximum payment period is 3
years, except that the total number of monthly assistance payments—
the payments for unemployment together with the payments for
reduced wages—could not exceed 36. An eligible employee required to
relocate would be entitled to reasonable moving and living expenses
as well as compensation for any loss incurred on the sale of a residence,
cancellation of a contract to purchase a residence, or cancellation of
such employee’s lease.
LOAN GUARANTY—SECTION 23
Since 1957 there has been a Government guaranteed loan program to
assist air carriers offering service to small communities in acquiring
aircraft. To date, the Government has guaranteed in excess of $200
million in loans under the program without a single default. This
program has been very important to our smaller local and regional
carriers in obtaining loans to purchase aircraft needed for small com-
munity air service.
Congress has renewed this loan guaranty program three times since
1957 at 5-year intervals. This section of the bill would renew the pro-
gram for another 5 years and broaden it to include the new classifica-
tion of carriers created for small community service—carriers certi-
ficated under section 420. These airlines, now known as commuters, are
not eligible for loan guaranties under the present act despite the fact
that they are major participants in the Nation’s small community air
service program.
The current limit of $30 million per airline in guaranty authority
has been extended to $100 million to reflect increases in aircraft costs in
the past 5 years and to allow a carrier to finance more aircraft under
the program than is presently possible.
In keeping pace with current business trends, the prohibition on the
guaranty or loans containing terms permitting full repayment more
than 10 years after execution has been changed to prohibit loans con-
taining more than 15-year repayment clauses.
The program has been extended for a 5-year term.
ADAP CONFORMING AMENDMENTS—SECTION 24
Section 24 of the bill provides amendments to the Airport and
Airway Development Act which insure that no airport operator will
be penalized with respect to ADAP fund eligibility as a result of this
bill. The bill’s potential changes in the nature of small community
service will require a comprehensive review of the ADAP funding
mechanism. However, until that review can properly be made, no air-
port should be placed in a less advantageous position for obtaining
Federal funds than they enjoy at present.
117
APPENDIX 5
SECRETARY OF LABOR'S DELEGATION OF
AUTHORITY AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978
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lty f°r thS Airline Deregulation
1. Purpose. To delegate authority and assign
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. This Order is issued pursuant to theDeregulation Act of 1978, P.L. No. 95-504.
b * Directives Affected
. The authorities delegatedherein are in addition to those delegated in Secretary'sOrders 6-78, 9-77, and 4-75, which Orders remain in
effect.
3* Background. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
curtails the regulatory authority of the Civil AeronauticsBoard in order to increase competition within the U. S.domestic airlines industry. Under provisions of the Act,protection would be afforded to all employees who had
four years of service upon enactment. Certain protection
provisions, such as first right of hire, aie effective
immediately. Other monetary protection would be pro-
vided for employees deprived of employment or adversely
affected with respect to compensation by a "qualifying
dislocation" as determined by the Civil Aeronautics









The Assistant Secretary for Employment and Trainingis delegated authority and assigned responsibility under
—
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 for:
(1)
The development, promulgation, and administration
of policies, regulations and procedures concerning benefitpayments required under Section 43.
(2) Maintenance of liaison with the Civil AeronauticsBoard; and beginning January 1, 1985, the Department of
Transportation, under the Sunset provisions of the Act.
(3) The determination of individual eligibility andthe administration of monthly benefit payments from a
separate account maintained in the Treasury of the United
States to be known as the Airline Employees Protective Account,
to affected employees as provided by Section 43(a) (b) (c) (d)
and (e)
.
(4) The implementation, maintenance and publication
of a comprehensive list of job openings available with
certified air carriers.
(5) Providing a full range of employment services
including job search and relocation for protected employees
seeking employment in other areas.
(6) Developing and carrying out, in cooperation
with LMSA, a program to inform and advise workers about
the Airline Employee Protection Program.
(7) Developing agreements for the administration
of the program by State Employment Security Agencies, as
agents for the United States, and in the absence of an
agreement with any State or Agency, a system for performing
the functions required to provide benefits to eligible
workers
(8)
Developing and maintaining a system for
monitoring Federal or State Agency performance in carrying






The Assi stant Secretary for Labor-Managpmpnf
Rel ation S is delegated authority and assigned responsibility
under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 for:
(1)
The development, promulgation and administration '
of policies, regulations and procedures, covering the first
right of hire — duty to hire and rehire provision ofSection 43(d) (1)
.
(2) The development and promulgation of policies,
regulations, and procedures covering the comprehensive joblist required under Section 43(d)(2).
(3) Encouraging negotiations between air carriers
and representatives of affected employees with respect to
rehiring practices and seniority.
(4) Requesting air carriers to file reports, data
and other pertinent information necessary for fulfilling
responsibilities under Section 43(d)(2).
c. The Assistant Secretary for Policy Evaluation and
Research shall assist the Assitant Secretaries for Fmplny-
ment and Training and for Labor-Management Relations in
developing major policy aspects of program regulations.
d. The Solicitor of Labor shall provide legal advice
and assistance to all Department of Labor officials relating
to the implementation of this Order.
5. Reservations of Authority . Reserved to the Secretary of
Labor are the following:
a. Submission of rules, regulations or reports to the
Secretary of Transportation and/or the Congress as appropriate.
b. Entering into agreements and modifications to
agreements with any State which will act as agent in carrying
out Department of Labor responsibilities under this Act.
c. Entering into agreements with agencies of the Federal
Government, as required, to carry out responsibilities under
this Act.
6. Effective Date. This Order is effective immediately.

